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Summary 
The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations estimates that 
as many as 840 million people are undernourished, most of them living in 
developing countries. Meanwhile many parties are looking to improve and 
create new plant varieties that gain greater yields, increased nutritional values, 
and other beneficial traits. These new plant varieties can gain protection by 
the international intellectual property regime allowing the owner of such 
protection to limit the ways in which the plant variety is used.  
Increasingly, new, improved plant varieties are dependent on foreign genetic 
resources. The potential value of these genetic resources is expressed in the 
value of biological diversity. Countries with large biological diversity are 
more likely to possess natural resources of value than countries with smaller 
resources, but can also expect greater costs for preserving that biodiversity. 
To offset the costs for many developing countries that possess the greatest 
biological diversity international instruments put in place an Access and 
Benefit-Sharing regime. Users of genetic resources found in and held by a 
country would need to obtain a prior informed consent and reach mutually 
agreed terms with the country providing the genetic resources before it could 
obtain any genetic resources. In some cases, the above would also apply to 
ex-situ holdings.  
The benefits gained from the utilization of the genetic resources would then 
be shared with the country providing the resources, or in some cases shared 
with a benefit-sharing fund that would further share the benefits with farmers, 
and in particular farmers of developing countries. However, the benefit-
sharing regime is primarily an incentive for states to preserve biodiversity, 
not for individuals to do so. Furthermore, many benefits acquired through 
research are not adapted to the needs of developing countries but go into crops 
and management techniques not suitable for developing countries.  
The benefits that farmers in the developing world are likely to directly see 
and take part of still rely in large part on the improved plant varieties and crop 
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management techniques that are capable of gaining protection under the 
international intellectual property regime. Moreover, the conserved 
biodiversity may act as a safety net against the effects of genetic erosion that 
may arise in the future. 
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Sammanfattning 
The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations uppskattar att 
så många som 840 miljoner människor är undernärda, de flesta av dem 
människor i utvecklingsländer. Samtidigt försöker många parter förbättra och 
skapa nya växtsorter som ger större skördar, ökade näringsvärden, och andra 
fördelaktiga egenskaper. Nya växtsorter kan få skydd genom den 
internationella immaterialrätten vilket gör att ägaren av ett sådant skydd ges 
rättigheter att begränsa de sätt som växtsorten används. 
Nya, förbättrade växtsorter är alltmer beroende av främmande genetiska 
resurser. Det potentiella värdet av dessa genetiska resurser uttrycks i värdet 
av den biologiska mångfalden. Länder med stor biologisk mångfald äger med 
större sannolikhet naturresurser av värde än länder med mindre biologisk 
mångfald, men kan också räkna med högre kostnader för att bevara den 
biologiska mångfalden. För att kompensera kostnaderna för många u-länder 
som har störst biologiska mångfald har internationella instrument infört en så 
kallad ”Access and Benefit-sharing” regim. Användare av genetiska resurser 
som finns i, och som innehas av ett land behöver få ett förhandsgodkännande 
och nå ömsesidigt överenskomna villkor med det land som tillhandahåller 
genetiska resurser innan användaren kan erhålla några genetiska resurser. I 
vissa fall gäller det ovan sagda också för ex-situ-bevarande. 
De fördelar som erhölls från nyttjandet av genetiska resurser skulle då delas 
med det land som tillhandahöll resurserna, eller i vissa fall delas med en 
stiftelse som ytterligare skulle fördela vinsterna med jordbrukare, och i 
synnerhet jordbrukare i utvecklingsländerna. Dock är fördelningen av 
vinsterna i första hand ett incitament för stater att bevara den biologiska 
mångfalden, inte för enskilda personer att göra det. Dessutom är många 
förmåner som förvärvas genom forskning inte anpassat till behoven i 
utvecklingsländerna, utan gäller grödor och tekniker som inte är lämpliga för 
utvecklingsländer. 
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De fördelar som jordbrukare i utvecklingsländerna sannolikt direkt får se och 
ta del av förlitar sig fortfarande till stor del på de förbättrade växtsorter och 
tekniker som sannolikt kan bli skyddade av den internationella 
immaterialrätten. Dessutom kan den bevarade biologiska mångfalden fungera 
som ett skyddsnät mot effekterna av genetisk utarmning som kan uppstå i 
framtiden. 
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Introduction  
1.1 General 
Few human rights can measure up to the right to food; without adequate food 
and nutrition almost all other rights a human is endowed with become moot. 
Yet the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 
estimates that 842 million persons went undernourished in 2011-2013, most 
of whom – some 827 million – were living in the developing countries of the 
world.1 Lack of sufficient micronutrients is still prevalent; one study 
estimates that deficiencies in vitamin A and zinc intakes accounted for more 
than one million deaths of children under 5 years old in 2004 and was a major 
cause for disability for children of the same age.2 
With the expected rise in population in the near future, agricultural yields will 
have to increase as well. Increasing agricultural yields globally can be done 
by expanding the amount of land that is being cultivated, by increasing the 
productivity of the land that is already being cultivated or by a combination 
of the two. Increasing the cultivated lands has negative effects on the 
environment as well as biological diversity and will face decreasing yields as 
the available soil will be of lesser quality.3 
Increasing the yields of the currently cultivated lands, then, becomes of much 
larger importance if we want to preserve biological diversity while still 
increasing the world’s food supply. Increasing the yields of crops is the goal 
for plenty of private sector entities and organisations as well as many public 
                                                 
1 FAO, IFAD and WFP, The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2013. The multiple 
dimensions of food security. Rome, FAO, 2013, page 8. 
2 Black, Robert E., Allen, Lindsay H., Bhutta, Zulfiqar A., Caulfield, Laura E., Onis, 
Mercedes de, Ezzati, Majid, Mathers, Colin, Rivera, Juan, “Maternal and Child 
Undernutrition: Global and Regional Exposures and Health Consequences” in The Lancet, 
vol. 371 (2008), pages 243-260, at pages 243 and 253. 
3 Mechlem, Kerstin, and Raney, Terri,  “Agricultural Biotechnology and the Right to 
Food”, in Francesco Francioni (ed.), Biotechnologies and international human rights, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2007, page 136-137. 
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sector entities. The current trends indicate that biotechnology and, in 
particular, genetic engineering will be the means to this goal. This so called 
Gene Revolution – also known as the era of genetic engineering – may, like 
its predecessor the Green Revolution, bring increased yields without having 
to cultivate new land. However, there are differences between the Green 
Revolution and the Gene Revolution. Whereas in the Green revolution, most 
of the research done, and knowledge gathered was in the public sector, in the 
Gene Revolution the locus of the research and knowledge lie in the private 
sector with intellectual property rights (IPR) protecting the outcome of the 
research and the knowledge gathered.  
As its name suggests, the Gene Revolution’s focus is on improving crops and 
plants through biotechnology, and in particular genetic engineering. 
Examples of the improvements biotechnology has already brought include 
introducing genetic material from bacterium to a plant, which produces a 
toxin that kills certain insects feeding off the plant, and transferring genetic 
material to a plant variety, thereby introducing a resistance towards 
glyphosate-based herbicides. 
A large biodiversity helps corporations and organizations in their genetic 
engineering. With a more varied genetic composition of individual 
organisms, as well as whole species, comes more opportunity to find valuable 
genetic material. Preserving the biological diversity is therefore a common 
interest of both private and public sector. 
To preserve the biological diversity is the objective of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD), and it recognizes the importance of biodiversity, 
the necessity of access to the genetic material of the organisms making up the 
biodiversity and the significance of sharing technologies in the calling to meet 
the need for food and eradicate hunger.4 
 
                                                 
4 Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5 1992,1760 U.N.T.S. 79, preamble, paragraph 
20. 
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Farmers are, as seen above, expected to ensure food security and protect 
biological diversity. However, the current tools to fulfil each goal undermine 
each other. The often hailed solution to global hunger, the Gene Revolution, 
creates vast monocultures where biological diversity is scarce and the price 
of protected seeds is high. Securing biodiversity on the other hand can often 
be economically detrimental to the farmer in the form of smaller harvests. The 
purpose of this thesis will thus be to examine access and benefit-sharing 
(ABS) and, in particular, its effects for farmers in the developing world.  
Given that farmers in many situations are the ones who actually preserve 
biological diversity and the strong protection and increased scope of IPRs 
relevant for the field my research question for this thesis will be two-pronged;  
 are farmers likely to see and benefit from ABS regimes set out in 
international instruments? 
 If yes, in what form?  
1.2 Method and Material 
A large part of this thesis will be regarding what the law actually is and says. 
This part will therefore focus on the international instruments available and 
applicable to the question posed above. Thus, instruments in the fields of 
intellectual property and, in particular, the instruments regarding ABS are 
studied in detail. The opinions of others as expressed in articles and books 
related to the subject are used to clarify the provisions of the instruments used.  
As the assessment of the law as it is focuses on the application of ABS in the 
developing world, the assessment will be conducted with a Third World 
Approach to International Law (TWAIL) in mind. This method will be useful 
in determining why the law is as it is, but also assessing its effectiveness. The 
thesis will not use TWAIL methodology and theory throughout the thesis, but 
rather it will be used as a tool when helpful and when necessary. As this thesis 
will attempt to assess the impact of ABS on farmers, primarily, in the 
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developing world, TWAIL offers a critical view to look at international law 
from the viewpoint of developing countries and their population.  
TWAIL is a critical school of thought that views international law as a tool 
of domination and subordination for developed countries at the expense of 
the third world. TWAIL argues that international law, in its history, set out a 
hierarchy, Europeans and non-Europeans, to subordinate the non-Europeans 
under the Europeans and that this subordination continues and is active to this 
day. As said by Julius Nyerere when speaking of the third world: “In 
international rule-making, we are recipients, not participants.”5  
TWAIL is suspicious of, if not in direct opposition to, international norms of 
European origin and in particular against norms claimed to be universal. 
Examples include many human rights but more notably economic values as 
expressed, e.g., in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement). 
While universal values may exist it is important that these values are not 
forced upon third world nations and peoples as the Truth.6 
In relation to this, I would also like to remark on the terminology used in the 
thesis. The terms “developed” and “developing” country are used throughout 
the thesis. These terms are problematic for several reasons: first, because it 
portrays states as belonging to homogenous groups based solely on their 
development and wealth, second because the terms are inexact and wrong (all 
states are in fact developing), and third because its use in the discourse 
produces a hierarchy between states based on wealth and development. It has 
however become an often-used term with a somewhat clear meaning. 
Alternative terms that explore the same dynamic (“North” versus “South”, 
                                                 
5 Nyerere, Julius, “South-South Option”, in Gauhaf, Altar (ed.) Third world strategy: 
economic and political cohesion in the South, Praeger in coop. with the Third world 
foundation, London, New York, 1983, at page 10. 
6 For more on TWAIL, see Mutua, Makau, and Anghie, Antony, “What Is TWAIL?” 
American Society Of International Law: Proceedings Of The Annual Meeting (2000), 
Vol.94 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 31 2000 pages 31-38. 
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“First world” versus “Third world”) could be used, but similar problems arise 
under each one. 
1.3 Delimitation 
There are several ways to address the issue of ABS in relation to human rights, 
as is my aim: through the right to health, the right to food, or the right to 
development to mention a few.  
While it would be interesting and worthwhile to, also, examine ABS in 
relation to genetic resources used in the pharmaceutical sector, it is not for 
this thesis. While there are similarities between the right to food and the right 
to health in relation to pharmaceutical products, IP protection and ABS this 
thesis will not discuss or answer questions regarding the right to health and 
pharmaceuticals. Focus will instead be on the right to food in relation to IPRs 
and ABS. 
Moreover, ABS could be considered more connected to the right to 
development (sustainable development in particular) than it is to the right to 
food. However, this aspect will not be discussed other than in relation to the 
right to food and as necessary. 
The UN Convention on the Law of the Seas 7 also contains an ABS regime, 
it, however, only applies to non-living resources.8 Consequently, the CBD 
will be applicable within the jurisdictional zones set out in the Convention in 
relation to genetic and living resources. The applicability of the Law of the 
Seas Convention to this thesis is therefore negligible.9 
                                                 
7 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
8 Lawson, Charles and Downing Susan, “It's patently absurd - Benefit sharing genetic 
resources from the sea under UNCLOS, the CBD and TRIPs”, Journal Of International 
Wildlife Law And Policy, vol. 5, particle 3, 1 January 2002, pages 211-233, at page 223. 
9 For more on the relationship between the CBD and the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Seas see Lawson and Downing, supra note 8. 
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I would also like to point out that this thesis will not go through the 
instruments article by article explaining the obligations it imposes. Rather 
relevant provisions of the instruments are extracted, studied and explained. 
1.4 Outline 
In order to comprehend the issues discussed in this thesis fully the reader will 
need some knowledge of the right to food. Chapter two of this thesis will 
therefore be dedicated to a short introduction on the right to food. However, 
by no means will this introduction serve as complete account of the right to 
food, it is merely a quick introduction for the readers convenience. 
The third chapter of this thesis will discuss IPRs in relation to agriculture, and 
plant varieties. IPR and protection over intellectual property has become a 
part of the agricultural sector in much the same way it is a part of the 
pharmaceutical sector. Similarly as well, it is the cause of concern for many 
parties. It will therefore be necessary to give an account of the contemporary 
IPRs affecting the agricultural sector. 
The fourth chapter explains ABS with a view of introducing the reader to the 
relevant instruments on ABS and will expound, briefly, on their relationships. 
The fifth chapter will be dedicated to show and explain some of the issues 
faced by farmers, mostly in the developing world, due to IPRs whereas 
chapter six will examine whether or not ABS is a workable solution for the 
problems introduced in the previous chapter.  
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The Right to food 
Several instruments proclaim the right to food. The right to food can be found 
in article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights10 as well as article 
11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR).11 An indirect right to food can however also be detected in the 
right to life. In reviewing the obligations under the right to life contained in 
article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it called 
on states to adopt “measures to eliminate malnutrition”.12 
The provision most relevant for the right to food is article 11 of the ICESCR 
because of the amount of states having become party to the ICESCR,13 its 
resemblance to the right to food as it was expressed in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, and because it is more detailed than other 
norms on the subject.14 According to the article, every person has the right 
“to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including 
adequate food.”15 The article also recognizes “the fundamental right of 
everyone to be free from hunger.”16 Moreover, limitations on the right to food 
must be “compatible with the nature of [the right].”17 Arguably, any limitation 
on the right to food would not be consistent with the nature of the right.18 
Article 4 of the ICESCR further provides that any limitation must be 
                                                 
10 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 
A (III), article 25. 
11 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
16 December 1966,  993 U.N.T.S. 3, article 11. 
12 UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), CCPR General Comment No. 6: , The Right to 
Life (Art. 6), 30 April 1982, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I), page 177, para 5. 
13 161 states are party to the covenant as of 2014-04-08. Number according to 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
3&chapter=4&lang=en [accessed 2014-04-08]. 
14 Alston, Philip, “ International Law and the Right to Food” in Eide, Asbjørn, Barth Eide, 
Wenche, Goonatilake, Susantha, Gussow, Joan, and Omawale (eds.), Food as a human 
right, United Nations Univiversity, Tokyo, 1984, page 165. 
15 UN General Assembly, supra note 11, article 11.1. 
16 Ibid, article 11.2. 
17 Ibid, article 4. 
18 Haugen, Hans Morten, The right to food and the TRIPS agreement: with a particular 
emphasis on developing countries' measures for food production and distribution, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2007, page 205. 
  14 
established in legislation in order to be complying with the ICESCR. It must 
be noted in relation to article 4 that the article is not to be interpreted as 
opening up for limitations, but rather as a protective barrier for the rights 
provided for in the ICESCR.19 
Article 5.1 of the ICESCR recognizes that no right in the ICESCR may be 
interpreted as to counteract another right provided for in the Covenant. Only 
those limitations recognized and allowed by the ICESCR may be 
implemented or executed.20 Article 5.2 provides that no article in the ICESCR 
may be used to prejudice a human right recognized in domestic law, other 
international instrument or custom.21 
There is debate, however, as to whether or not there actually exist a right to 
food, whether or not the instruments available lay out an actual obligation for 
states. The right to food is hardly justiciable in the same manner as the right 
to freedom from torture,22 or the right to form trade unions,23 and the right, if 
it exists, must be realized progressively, in steps.24  The Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have nonetheless recognized that 
certain elements of the right to food are core obligations that a state must fulfil 
in order to comply with the ICESCR. The core content of the right as 
identified by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
                                                 
19 The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1987/17, Annex, paragraph 46. 
See also UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), CESCR 
General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education  (Art. 13), 8 December 1999, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/1999/10, para 42, and UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR), CESCR General Comment No. 14: The Right to the highest attainable standard 
of health (Art. 12), 11 August 2000, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, para 28 where they recite the 
view given in the Limburg Principles. 
20 Haugen, supra note 18, page 210 and The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 19, 
paragraph 57. 
21 Haugen, supra note 18, page 210 and The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 19, 
paragraph 58. 
22 See UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 
December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, article 7. 
23 See UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 16 December 1966,  993 U.N.T.S. 3, article 8.1 (a). 
24 See ibid, article 2.1 and UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR), CESCR General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11) , 12 
May 1999, UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/5, paras 6 and 14. 
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obligates states to make available, and accessible, food of sufficient quality 
and quantity for individuals in a way that does not interfere with other human 
rights.25  
Furthermore, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have 
found that to achieve, progressively, the full realization of the rights in the 
convention any retrogressive measures taken may only be justified by 
reference to the “totality of the rights provided for in the [ICESCR] and in the 
context of the full use of the maximum available resources.”26 
The states parties to the ICESCR have an obligation to respect (avoid 
depriving), protect (prevent third parties from depriving) and fulfil (take 
positive steps to secure) the right to food.27 Moreover, for the obligations of 
state parties under the ICESCR to be fulfilled the food must be available 
accessible, “acceptable within a given culture”, and adaptable.28 
The obligation to progressively realise the right to food also mandate states 
to take measures “to improve methods of production, conservation and 
distribution of food by making full use of technical and scientific 
knowledge”.29 This obligation shall be done individually as well as through 
international cooperation.  
                                                 
25 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), CESCR General 
Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11), supra note 24, para 8. For more 
on core obligations see UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 
CESCR General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art. 2, par. 1), 
14 December 1990, UN Doc. E/1991/23(SUPP), pages 83-87. 
26 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), CESCR General 
Comment No. 3: The nature of States parties obligations (Art. 2, par.1), supra note 25, para 
9. 
27 Schutter, Olivier de, International human rights law: cases, materials, commentary, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, page 242 and UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), CESCR General Comment No. 12: The Right to 
Adequate Food (Art. 11), supra note 24, para 15. 
28 Schutter, supra note 27, pages 253-256 and UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR), CESCR General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food 
(Art. 11 supra note 24, paras 8-13. 
29 UN General Assembly, supra note 11, article 11.2. 
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The right is not only limited to food but also include “access to the means of 
producing it.”30 The Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food has 
continuously emphasized access to seeds and other propagating material as 
an important aspect of the right food and has highlighted the international IPR 
regime as a cause for concern in this regard.31 In this regard, it should be noted 
that IPR may be viewed as a policy measure adopted by state parties to ensure 
that research is done in order to improve methods of production of food. 
With regard to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, they 
have not been able to consider individual communications nor inter-state 
communications in the past. However, the optional protocol to the ICESCR32 
does allow for both individual and inter-state communications for states upon 
ratification or accession to optional protocol and acquiesce to the competence 
of the committee to hear inter-state communications. The optional protocol 
only entered into force last year, it is thus too early to evaluate the work of 
the committee in this regard.  
 
                                                 
30 UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Report to the UN Commission on Human 
Rights, 10-11, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2001/53 (7 February 2001) (prepared by Jean Ziegler), 
para 73. 
31 Schutter, Olivier de, UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Address at High-Level 
Conference on World Food Security: The Challenges of Climate Change and Bioenergy 
(June 3-5 2008), available at http://www.fao.org/foodclimate/conference/statements/day3-
am/en/ [accessed 2014-04-09] 
32 UN General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 10 December 2008, UN Doc. Doc. A/63/435. 
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IPRs and genetic resources 
For a long time genetic resources have been of fundamental importance to 
humans having particular importance in the fields of agriculture and 
medicine. Today, genetic resources continue to be important in these two 
fields but it is also of growing importance in many other fields.33 This thesis 
will however focus on one of the two fields in which genetic resources have 
been, and continue to be, of great importance: agriculture. 
Technological advances within the field can lead to protection over the 
advancements, mainly, in the form patents or other intellectual property rights 
(IPRs). The TRIPs Agreement,34 as an annex to the Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organisation,35 is a multilateral instrument imposing legal 
obligations on all WTO members. As the WTO, at the time of writing, has 
159 members,36 the TRIPs Agreement serves as a good starting ground for an 
examination of the protection offered for intellectual property in the relevant 
field due to the widespread acceptance of the terms conditioned by the 
agreement and its relevance to the matter at hand. It will, however, be 
necessary to examine other international instruments as well for a complete 
picture of the offered protection, more on that below. 
                                                 
33 Jeffery, Michael I., ”Bioprospecting: Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing 
under the Convention on Biodiversity and the Bonn Guidelines”, in Singapore Journal of 
International & Comparative Law, vol. 6 (2002), pages 747-808, at page 747-748. 
34 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299; 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). 
35 WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
April 15 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994). 
36 Number according to http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm 
[accessed 2014-03-18] 
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1.5 Patent protection in the TRIPs 
Agreement 
Patents are the relevant IPR referred to in the TRIPs Agreement concerning 
agriculture and pharmaceutical products. While TRIPs Agreement sets out 
minimum standards, which the member states of the WTO are obligated to 
put in place, it is important to note that member states in their domestic 
legislation may set standards that are higher than those required by the TRIPs 
Agreement.37 In accordance with the TRIPs Agreement member states are 
obligated to enact laws that give protection and ensure enforcement over 
patentable subject matter proscribed in article 27 (1) of the TRIPs Agreement. 
Patents are to be made available as protection for “inventions, whether 
products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, 
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application”.38 Subject 
matter over which a state does not have to grant patents include inventions 
where it is necessary to omit the invention from patent protection to protect 
ordre public or morality in accordance with article 27 (2). States also do not 
have to give patent protection on “plants and animals other than micro-
organisms organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production 
of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological 
processes.”39 In this case, states have a choice as to how to protect the subject 
matter: through patents, through an effective sui generis system or a 
combination of the two.40  
                                                 
37 Helfer, Laurence R. & Austin, Graeme W., Human rights and intellectual property: 
mapping the global interface, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011, page 28 and 
Roffe, Pedro, Spennemann, Cristoph and von Braun, Johanna “ Intellectual property rights 
in free trade agreements: moving beyond TRIPS minimum standards” in Correa, Carlos M. 
(ed.) Research Handbook on the Protection of Intellectual Property under WTO Rules, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2010, page 267. 
38 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 34, 
article 27(1). 
39 Ibid, article 27 (3) (b). 
40 Ibid. 
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The patent allocates certain exclusive rights onto its owner. Such rights 
include the right to prevent a third party from “making, using, offering for 
sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that product” or process without 
consent from the patent owner.41 In relation to agriculture it is important to 
note that using in the sense it is used in article 28 (1) includes “planting, 
harvesting, saving, re-planting and exchanging seeds”.42 
Exceptions in the TRIPs Agreement to the exclusive rights conferred to the 
owner of the patent are permitted provided they (i) are limited, (ii) “do not 
unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of the patent” and (iii) “do 
not unreasonably prejudice against the legitimate interests” of the owner of 
the patent.43  
Moreover the TRIPs Agreement also allows for a more limited and specific 
exception in article 31. The exception in article 31 allows a state to authorize 
the use of an invention under patent protection, even by third parties, i.e. a 
compulsory license. The exception laid out in article 31 does require not only 
that adequate remuneration is paid to the rights-holder but also that, in 
circumstances not involving a national emergency; unsuccessful negotiations 
have taken place prior to the issuing of a compulsory license.44 While the 
exception in part targets the abuse of the patent by its rights-holder,45 any 
authorization of use of a patent must be considered on its individual merits.46 
Concerning genes and genetic material, it is worth noting that the TRIPs 
Agreement does not expressly mention them. While a divergence has 
emerged between developed states and developing states where developed 
states are more inclined to allow patents on purely isolated or purified genes 
                                                 
41 Ibid, article 28 (1). 
42 Mechlem and Raney, supra note 3, page 156. 
43 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 34, 
article 30. 
44 Ibid, article 31 (b) and (h). 
45 Yamane, Hiroko, Interpreting TRIPS: globalisation of intellectual property rights and 
access to medicines, Hart, Oxford, 2011, page 170. 
46 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 34, 
article 31 (a). 
  20 
and developing states less inclined to allow for patent protection on genes and 
genetic material at all, the patentability of genes and genetic material will 
depend on the interpretation of “invention”.47 If genes and genetic material 
are considered discovered rather than invented, it would prevent them from 
being patentable subject matter under the TRIPs Agreement. If, instead, the 
genes are considered invented after having been isolated or purified they 
would be part of the patentable subject matter prescribed by the TRIPs 
Agreement. Modified genes unavailable in nature, on the other hand does 
seem to fall within the ambit of patents in the TRIPs Agreement; refusal to 
grant patents on such genes, thus, does not comply with the TRIPs 
Agreement.48 
There are several factors contributing to the success of the TRIPs Agreement. 
One is the fact that the TRIPs Agreement sets out extensive requirements as 
for the effective enforcement of the IPRs protected by the TRIPs 
Agreement.49 Not only must state parties adopt legislation in line with the 
provisions regarding protection for intellectual property, they must also, and 
unlike previous treaties on intellectual property, make sure that they offer 
effective enforcement of the rights granted through the TRIPs Agreement.50 
If a member state of the WTO is of the view that another member states is not 
in compliance regarding its obligations under the TRIPs Agreement (or one 
of many other agreement listed in the appendix to the DSU)51 the former state 
may institute proceedings before the dispute settlement body. 52 The DSU 
mandates that a dispute settlement body is to be established in article 2 of the 
DSU. The dispute settlement body itself establishes panels and a standing 
                                                 
47 Helfer & Austin, supra note 37, page 387 and Mechlem and Raney, supra note 3, page 
155. 
48 Helfer & Austin, supra note 37, pages 387-388. 
49 Ibid, page 28. 
50 Yamane, supra note 45, page 175 and Helfer & Austin, supra note 37, page 28. 
51 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 15 
April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 401; 33 ILM 1226 (1994), article 1.1 and Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, The 
GATT/WTO dispute settlement system: international law, international organizations and 
dispute settlement, Kluwer, London, 1997, page 177. Note that the Understanding is also 
applicable to agreements set out in appendix 2 to the Understanding, subject to special and 
additional rules that may apply according to article 1.2 of the Understanding. 
52 Helfer & Austin, supra note 37, page 28. 
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appellate body that hear the disputes, and then adopts the panel reports as well 
as the appellate body reports.53 If a panel has found that a state does not 
comply with its obligations and yet the state does not take measures to bring 
itself into compliance, then the complaining state is to enter into negotiation 
concerning appropriate compensation.54 If no such compensation can be 
agreed upon, the complaining state may apply for an authorization to 
“retaliate”, that is, “to suspend the application to the Member concerned of 
concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements” within the 
same sector as the panel has found a violation.55 Moreover, a state may be 
allowed to “cross-retaliate”, that is, to suspend application of concessions or 
other obligations in other sectors under the agreements in appendix 1 to the 
Understanding.56 The “retaliation” may not go beyond nullifying the 
impairment.57  
1.6 Sui Generis protection of plant varieties  
In accordance with article 27 (3) (b) states are not obliged to grant patent 
protection on plants, animals, and essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants and animals. While the TRIPs Agreement allow states to 
grant patents on these classes, they also have the option of providing an 
alternative protection, for plant varieties, in the form of an effective sui 
generis system or a combination of patent protection and a sui generis system.  
What the sui generis system entails specifically is unstated, but the provision 
declares that the system must be effective. What an effective system involves 
is unclear. However, an effective sui generis system, arguably, must: (i) 
provide protection for all species and genera, and (ii) give the rights-holder 
                                                 
53 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, supra 
note 51, articles 6, 16, and 17  and Cameron, James & Campbell, Karen (eds.), Dispute 
resolution in the World Trade Organisation, Cameron & May, London, 1998, page 32. 
54 Yamane, supra note 45, page 182. 
55 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, supra 
note 51, articles 22.2 and 22.3 (a). 
56 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes supra note 
51, article 22.3 (b). 
57 Yamane, supra note 45, page 182. 
  22 
an exclusive right to determine how the protected material is used or receive 
compensation when the protected material is used. Furthermore, it must (iii) 
mandate that the principles of national treatment as well as most-favoured 
nation treatment are provided to plant breeders, and (iv) provide an effective 
enforcement mechanism allowing breeders to uphold their exclusive rights.58 
While states are permitted to design their own domestic sui generis system, 
they are also free to enter into and become members of international 
organizations designed to provide an effective sui generis system. One such 
organization is the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants (UPOV), which is recognized as fulfilling the requirements on an 
effective sui generis system.59As the UPOV, at present, have 71 member 
states it provides a useful entry point into an examination of a sui generis 
system in accordance with article 27(3)(b) of the TRIPs Agreement.60 To 
juxtapose the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants (UPOV Convention),61 the sui generis system adopted by India, who 
is not a member of UPOV, will be examined as well. Whereas developed 
countries favour the UPOV Convention it is not favoured by the least 
developed countries (LDC),62 and, to a lesser extent, developing countries. 
The sui generis system adopted by India, in contrast, has been recognized as 
more suited to the needs of developing countries.63 
                                                 
58 Helfer & Austin, supra note 37, pages 385-386. 
59 Dhar, Biswajit, Sui Generis Systems for Plant Variety Protection, Quaker United Nations 
Office, Geneva, 2002, page 7, and UPOV, Press Release no 30, Geneva, 21 April 1998, and 
statement made by Matthijs Gueze at the Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of UPOV 
held in 1991, Records of the Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the International 
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Geneva. 1992, para 74.2, p 180. 
60 Member states according to http://www.upov.int/members/en/ [accessed 2014-03-20]. 
61 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, December 2, 
1961, 815 U.N.T.S. 89, as well as its revised acts from 1978 and 1991. 
62 Out of the 71 member states to the UPOV Convention, none is also recognized as a least 
developed country. Compare list of members to the UPOV Convention at 
http://www.upov.int/export/sites/upov/members/en/pdf/pub423.pdf [accessed 2014-03-27] 
and list of least developed countries at 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc/ldc_list.pdf [accessed 2014-03-27]. 
63 Sahai, Suman, ” India’s plant variety protection and Farmers’ Rights Act, 2001”, in 
Current Science, vol. 84, no. 3, 10 February 2003, page 407-412, at page 407. 
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1.6.1 Protection for plant varieties in the UPOV 
Convention 
Becoming a contracting party to the UPOV Convention is by no means 
necessary to fulfil the requirement of article 27 (3) (b) in the TRIPs 
Agreement, it is but one of the options states have regarding plant variety 
protection. Since many states have become members of the UPOV, the UPOV 
Convention represents a widely accepted sui generis system for providing 
plant variety protection.  
After the initial adoption of the 1961 UPOV Convention,64 and the adoption 
of the amending act in 1972, the convention was revised in 1978,65 and in 
1991.66 Now, only one out of 71 members of the UPOV is bound, solely, to 
the act of 1961 and the additional act adopted in 1972, and only 19 are bound 
by the act of 1978.67 The remaining 51 parties of the UPOV are bound by the 
act of 1991.68 With the entry into force of the act of 1991 in 1998,69 states 
looking to become members of the UPOV can only do so by acceding to the 
act of 1991.70 The act of 1991 will therefore be used for the examination of 
the UPOV Convention, as the majority of the members of the UPOV are 
parties to the act of 1991 and new members can only accede to the act of 1991.  
                                                 
64 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, December 2, 
1961, 815 U.N.T.S. 89.  
65 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, December 2, 
1961, as revised at Geneva on November 10 1972, on October 23 1978, 1861 U.N.T.S. 281. 
66 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, December 2 
1961, as revised at Geneva on November 10 1972, on October 23 1978, and on March 19 
1991. 
67 See list of members available at 
http://www.upov.int/export/sites/upov/members/en/pdf/pub423.pdf [accessed 2014-03-27]. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Helfer & Austin, supra note 37, page 382, note 41. 
70 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, supra note 66, 
article 37 (3). 
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The act of 1991 fulfil the requirements of an effective sui generis system by 
requiring contracting parties to offer protection for all plant genera and 
species,71 and by granting the rights-holder (breeder in the terms of the UPOV 
Convention) a set of exclusive rights.72 Furthermore, with regard to an 
effective enforcement mechanism, the act of 1991 mandates that states grant 
and offer protection for the rights conveyed in the act to breeders of protected 
plant varieties and that it offers legal remedies for breeders to enforce, 
effectively, the rights granted to them in the convention.73 
Concerning the principles of national treatment, it must be noted that the act 
of 1991 only obligates states to afford national treatment to nationals of other 
states members to the UPOV Convention.74 It is unlikely that the act of 1991 
complies with article 3 of the TRIPs Agreement.75 States, members to both 
the act of 1991 and the WTO, will have to accord the same treatment to other 
WTO members regardless of whether or not they are also members of the 
UPOV.76 Concerning the principle of most favoured nation the UPOV 
Convention does not have provisions in place, but what has been said 
regarding the principle of national treatment should hold true here as well. 
In accordance with the act of 1991 the rights-holder, or breeder in the terms 
of the act of 1991, is the person who bred or discovered a variety.77 The 
breeder gains protection on such plant varieties that are new, distinct, uniform 
and stable.78 The exclusive rights granted to the breeder of a protected plant 
variety includes production and reproduction, the conditioning of propagating 
                                                 
71 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, supra note 66, 
article 3. Note that members are allowed a transitional period before which they are not 
obligated to protect all plant species and genera. 
72 Ibid, article 14. 
73 Ibid, articles 1 and 30 (1) (i). 
74 Ibid, article 4. 
75 Leskien, Dan and Flitner, Michael, Intellectual Property Rights and Plant Genetic 
Resources: Options for a Sui Generis System, Issues in Genetic Resources No. 6, 
International Plant Genetic Resources Institute, Rome, Italy, 1997, page 30-31. 
76 Ibid, page 31. 
77 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, supra note 66, 
article 1 (iv). 
78 Ibid, articles 2 and 5. See also articles 6-9 for more regarding the requirements. 
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material for the purpose of propagation, as well as offering propagating 
material for sale, exporting and importing.79  
Article 15 of the act of 1991 provides for mandatory and optional exceptions 
to the breeders’ rights. The mandatory exceptions in article 15 (1) cover “acts 
done privately and for non-commercial purposes”, “acts done for 
experimental purposes”, and, to a lesser extent, “acts done for the purpose of   
breeding other varieties”.80 The optional exception provided for in article 15 
(2) would allow farmers to use propagating material on their own holdings 
that they have harvested from their own holding.81 The provision only allows 
for personal use of their harvest, but it may be for commercial purposes.82 
However, the optional exception provided in the act of 1991 does not allow 
farmers to exchange or sell the propagating material with other farmers (so-
called brown bagging) common in many developing as well as developed 
countries.83 The optional exception was not meant to introduce a new 
exception to breeders’ rights but rather to keep a farmers’ privilege in 
countries where such a privilege existed and was commonplace.84 The 
exception must however be limited so that it is “within reasonable limits and 
subject to the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of the breeder.”85 The 
exact meaning of this passage is unclear but it has been suggested that 
compliance requires states to demand that remuneration is paid when the 
exceptions is used, safeguard that only farms of a certain size benefit from the 
                                                 
79 Ibid, article 14. 
80 Ibid, article 15 (1). 
81 Ibid, article 15 (2). 
82 Compare ibid, articles 15 (1) (i) and 15 (2). If the optional exception did not in fact allow 
commercial use, the optional exception would be redundant as it covers the same acts as 
expressed in article 15(1) (i). 
83 Helfer & Austin, supra note 37, page 384, and Leskien and Flitner, supra note 75, page 
60. 
84 See International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Explanatory Notes 
on Exceptions to the Breeder’s Right under the 1991 act of the UPOV Convention, adopted 
by the Council at its forty-third ordinary session on October 22, 2009, UPOV/EXN/EXC/1, 
page 8 when referring to the Records of the Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants. 
85 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, supra note 66, 
article 15 (2). 
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exception or limit the amount of one’s harvest that can be saved to be reused 
to following year.86 
1.6.2 Protection of Plant Varieties in India 
As stated above, India is not a member of UPOV and has chosen to provide 
for the protection mandated by article 27 (3) (b) of the TRIPs Agreement with 
their own sui generis system through the Plant Variety Protection and 
Farmers’ Rights Act of 2001.87 The act allows for protection on plant varieties 
specified by the government, extant varieties, and farmers’ varieties.88 By 
mandating that the government specify which species and genera are eligible 
for protection the act allows the government of India to add, in increments, 
new genera and species that can be protected by the provisions of the act.89 
A variety is eligible for protection if the variety is new, distinctive, uniform, 
and stable.90 In the sense used in the act, new means previously unexploited 
on the market for a period of time; distinctive meaning distinguishable from 
other protected varieties or varieties whose existence is common knowledge; 
uniform meaning it’s essential characteristics remain within the expected 
variation caused by its propagation; and stable meaning it retains the essential 
characteristics of the variety throughout propagation.91 
Protection for a variety may be granted upon applications for registration 
made by the breeder of the variety, a farmer or group of farmers claiming to 
                                                 
86 International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, supra note 84, page 9-
10. 
87 Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights Act, 2001, act no. 53 of 2001, assented to 
October 30 2001 and Sahai, Suman, ” India’s plant variety protection and Farmers’ Rights 
Act, 2001”, in Current Science, vol. 84, no. 3, 10 February 2003, page 407-412, at page 
407. 
88 Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights Act, supra note 87, section 14, and 
subsection 2 of section 29. 
89 Ibid, subsection (a) of section 14 and subsection 2 of section 29. See also notifications in 
the Gazette regarding new crop-species available for protection at 
http://www.plantauthority.gov.in/gazette.htm [accessed 2014-03-28]. 
90 Ibid, subsection 1 of section 15. Note however that according to subsection 2 of section 
15 extant varieties does not need to conform to the requirement of novelty. 
91 Ibid, subsection 3 of section 15. 
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be the breeder of the variety, or a university or other “publicly funded 
agricultural institution”, individually or jointly.92 By allowing any person to 
apply for registration of a variety, the act does not distinguish between 
nationals and non-nationals.93 
The rights conferred to the breeder of a registered variety include exclusive 
rights to “produce, sell, market, distribute, import or export the variety”.94 
Furthermore, the act makes it a criminal offense to apply a false 
denomination,95 but also allows the rights-holder to sue for relief in the form 
of an injunction and “damages or a share of the profit”.96 
The act does however also allow for some farmers’ rights. Farmers are given 
a right to “save, use, sow, re-sow, exchange, share or sell” that which was 
produced on their farm. This includes protected varieties; provided the farmer 
does not use the breeders’ brand, or otherwise make it known that the seeds 
are of a protected variety.97 The provision protects the farmers’ privilege as it 
was prior to the enactment of the act,98 but also protects the breeder of the 
variety in that he maintains his right to control the market of his product.99 
The farmers’ right expressed in the Indian sui generis system is a broader 
exception to breeders’ rights than that expressed, and discussed above, in the 
UPOV Convention.100 Whereas the UPOV Convention only mandates an 
exception for personal and non-commercial usages, and allows an exception 
for personal but commercial, the Indian sui generis system allows for the 
                                                 
92 Ibid, section 16. 
93 Ibid, section 16. 
94 Ibid, subsection 1 of section 28. 
95 Ibid, section 70-73. 
96 Ibid, section 64-66. 
97 Ibid, subsection 1 (iv) of section 39. 
98 Subsection 1 (iv) of section 59 of the act makes it clear that it does not intend to create a 
new exception or right for farmers by stating that the right only applies “in the same 
manner as [the farmer] was entitled before the coming into force of this act.” 
99 Sahai, supra note 87, at page 409. 
100 See exceptions discussed in chapter 2.2.1 of this thesis. 
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exception both for non-personal, and for commercial use (by allowing 
farmers to both exchange and sell their seeds).101 
Further provisions in the act benefitting farmers or extending the rights of 
farmers include a prohibition of GURT or other so-called terminator 
technology in registered and protected varieties,102 and protection against 
infringements of breeders’ rights where the farmer was not aware that such a 
right existed.103 
Moreover, allowing for the registration of extant varieties and farmers’ 
varieties has two main results: first, the registration prevents otherwise known 
varieties from being registered and protected as new varieties, and second, 
the registration allows those registering the extant and farmers’ varieties to 
collect licensing fees should the variety be of interest for creating essentially 
derived varieties.104 This is especially so as the act requires breeders to 
provide so called “passport data” regarding the new variety on which they 
seek registration. The passport includes data on the parental lines from which 
the variety was derived, geographical location of genetic material that 
contributed to the new variety as well as persons who have contributed in the 
creation of the new variety.105 
                                                 
101 Compare Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights Act, supra note 87, subsection 1 
(iv) of section 39 and International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants, supra note 66, article 15. See also Sahai, supra note 87, at page 407. 
102 Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights Act, supra note 87, subsection 1 (c) of 
section 18. GURT (Genetic use restriction technology) or terminator technology can be 
used in plant varieties to restrict the use or benefit derived from the plant variety. This can 
be done by making seeds harvested from the plant variety sterile, and therefore unusable as 
propagating material, or by having desired attributes dependent on the use of a particular 
chemical sold. Whereas the first method restricts everyone from re-sowing harvested seeds 
(including for personal and non-commercial purposes), the second method only restricts 
certain benefits of the plant variety to those who also buy the specific chemicals and does 
not seem to be prohibited by the section.  
103 Ibid, section 42. 
104 Kochupillai, Mrinalini, “The Indian PPV&FR Act, 2001: Historical and Implementation 
Perspectives.” in Journal Of Intellectual Property Rights vol. 16, issue 2 (2011): 88-101 at 
page 96. 
105 Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights Act, supra note 87, subsection 1 (e) of 
section 18.  
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Access and Benefit-sharing 
1.7 Convention on Biological Diversity 
The Convention on Biological Diversity was adopted in 1992, and entered 
into force in 1993.106 Since its adoption, the CBD has gathered 194 
contracting parties, the latest member state being South Sudan, which 
deposited its instrument of accession in February of 2014.107 The CBD has 
three main objectives: “the conservation of biological diversity, the 
sustainable use of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of the 
benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources.”108 The CBD 
recognizes that biological diversity is distributed asymmetrically and that, at 
large, the main reservoirs containing a large biodiversity are currently found 
in the developing world.109 This recognition, coupled with the realization that 
the conservation of biological diversity would put an undue burden and cost 
upon the biodiversity rich countries, relative to the biodiversity poor 
countries.110 To counter the higher cost for the developing, biodiversity rich 
countries the CBD obliges the developed member states to provide financial 
resources so that developing states can achieve the objectives of the 
convention.111 However, the CBD also reminds member states that the extent 
                                                 
106 Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5 1992,1760 U.N.T.S. 79. 
107 See press release by the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, March 7 
2014, available at http://www.cbd.int/press-releases/default.shtml [accessed 2014-04-04]. 
108 Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 106, article 1. 
109 Only two of the so-called megadiverse countries are in the top quartile of the United 
Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index: the United States and 
Australia. A megadiverse country is a concept introduced to highlight that certain areas are 
more biodiversity rich than others are. Megadiverse countries must be endemic to at least 
5000 of the world’s plants. For more on megadiverse countries see Mittermeier, A. Russel, 
‘Primate Diversity and the Tropical Forest: Case Studies from Brazil and Madagascar and 
the Importance of the Megadiversity Countries’ in  Wilson, Edward Osbourne (ed), 
Biodiversity, The National Academies Press, 1988, and the entry on Megadiversity 
countries in A-Z Guide of Areas of Biodiversity Importance. The UN Environment 
Programme & World Conservation Monitoring Centre, available at 
http://www.biodiversitya-z.org/areas/26 [accessed 2014-04-04]. 
110 Glowka, Lyle et al (eds.), A guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, IUCN the 
World Conservation Union, Gland, 1994, 2nd printing 1996, page 1. 
111 Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 106, article 20 (2). 
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to which developing countries can fulfil its commitment to the CBD will be 
dependent upon the financial resources developed states can assist with as 
well as the transfer of technology.112 In other words, and as the preamble of 
the CBD affirms, “the conservation of biological diversity is a common 
concern of humankind”.  
The preamble of the CBD also recognizes, and reaffirms in articles 3 and 15, 
that states have sovereign rights over their natural resources. This sovereign 
right is coupled with the duty to conserve the biological diversity and to use 
its components in a sustainable manner.113 Although conservation is a matter 
and concern of all, the conservation of biological diversity within a state’s 
jurisdiction is, ultimately, a matter for that state.114  
The principle that a state has a sovereign right over resources found in that 
state’s jurisdiction was first expressed in Principle 21 of the Stockholm 
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment.115 
Prior to the adoption of the CBD the prevailing view had been that, as 
expressed in the non-binding, International Undertaking on Plant Genetic 
Resources, “plant genetic resources are a heritage of mankind and 
consequently should be available without restriction.”116 It is important to 
note that IPR systems still afforded protection upon inventions stemming 
from genetic resources and that not all genetic resources were freely 
available.117 It can also be worth noting that it is debated whether or not the 
                                                 
112 Ibid, article 20 (4). 
113 Glowka et al, supra note 110, page 3. 
114 See for example Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 106, articles 6, 8 and 
10. 
115 Glowka et al, supra note 110, page 26, and Stockholm Declaration, in UN, Report of the 
Conference on the Human Environment, A/CONF.48/14/Rev 1, New York, 1972, pages 3-
5. Note that article 3 of the CBD copies verbatim Principle 21. 
116 FAO Conference, Rome, Italy, November 5-23 1983, International Undertaking on 
Plant Genetic Resources, UN Doc. C/83/REP, article 1. See also Jeffery, supra note 33, at 
page 758, Morgera, Elisa, Buck, Matthias & Tsioumani, Elsa (ed.), The 2010 Nagoya 
Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing in perspective: implications for international law 
and implementation challenges [Electronic resource], Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 
2012, pages 3-4, and Jonge, Bram De, “What Is Fair And Equitable Benefit-Sharing?” 
Journal Of Agricultural & Environmental Ethics, vol. 24, issue 2, 2011, pages 127-146, at 
page 129. 
117 Andanda, Pamela, Schroeder, Doris, Chaturvedi, Sachin, Mengesha, Emezat 
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common heritage of mankind principle applies to samples taken abroad and 
now stored in developed countries or if the state from where these samples 
were taken have a right to those samples or compensation. 
Including the principle of sovereign rights over natural resources in the CBD 
as a binding provision meant an end to the idea of genetic resources as a 
common heritage of humankind.118 Access to the genetic resources of the 
member states to the CBD would from now on be conditioned on the prior 
informed consent of the state in whose jurisdiction the genetic resources 
exist,119 and such access would be on “mutually agreed terms”.120 It must be 
noted that receiving the prior informed consent of the relevant state may not 
be the only requirement to be fulfilled. Article 8 (j) of the convention call on 
states to promote the “wider application [of traditional knowledge] with the 
approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge”, states therefore 
may implement national laws that require the consent of the group or person 
possessing knowledge coveted by the persons seeking the genetic 
resources.121 States may however also obtain such consent from the group or 
person holding such knowledge on their own that would allow the state to 
consent on the behalf of that group or person.122 
Assigning sovereign states rights over its genetic resources meant that states 
were now in possession of potentially great, untapped riches. The value in 
biodiversity lies in the differences in genetic composition between 
“individuals, communities, populations, species, and so on.”123 This idea of 
value is largely that of the private sector, it means that conserving the 
biodiversity of the world means conserving the genetic material that may be 
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of instrumental value. This idea of instrumental value (that the value of 
something “lies in the use to which it may be put”124) in nature is not new.125 
Similar, and just as anthropocentric, is the idea that nature has an inherent 
value, an aesthetical value.126 The CBD also recognize the instrumental and 
inherent values of biological diversity from an anthropocentric point of view, 
however, it also recognizes that biological diversity has an intrinsic value, a 
value in, of and for itself, a value that does not reflect its usefulness or beauty 
to an external appraiser.127 It is, nonetheless, the instrumental values in 
biodiversity that the CBD emphasize and it is in the instrumental values that 
we find the reasons for access and benefit-sharing. Access to instrumentally 
valuable genetic material must be compensated for.128 It was due to the 
expected values lying in the rich biological diversity that national sovereignty 
over natural resources was recognized.129 The uneven distribution of the 
expected wealth that genetic resources would bring also explains the 
introduction of benefit-sharing as it could bring about equity on an inter-state 
level.130 It was however also believed that benefit-sharing would serve as an 
incentive for developing countries to actually preserve the biodiversity that 
existed within its borders, despite the costs associated with such 
preservation.131 
The main provision regarding benefit-sharing in the convention can be found 
in article 15. Article 15(7) maintains that contracting parties are to take 
“legislative, administrative or policy measures […] with the aim of sharing 
[…] the results of research and development and the benefits arising from the 
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commercial and other utilization of genetic resources with the Contracting 
Party providing such resources.” The paragraph further points to article 16 
and 19 implying that benefits that are to be shared with the state supplying 
the genetic resources may include access to and transfer of technology, 
participation in the biotechnological research on said genetic resources and 
priority access to the results of research on said genetic resources.132 
Moreover, article 15(7) mandates that benefit-sharing shall be based on 
mutually agreed upon terms.133 
There exist divergent views as to the link between access and benefit-sharing 
in article 15 of the CBD. While article 15(4) of the CBD states that access 
must be “subject to the provisions of this article”,134 Morgera and Tsioumani 
argue that article 15(7) concerns inter-state benefit-sharing and that therefore 
there is no link between granting access to a private entity and benefit-sharing 
in the mutually agreed terms between said private entity and the providing 
state.135 Singh Nijar on the other hand is of the view, based on the loss of the 
link in the Nagoya Protocol, that such a link is implicit to the article.136 
It is important to note that the benefits mentioned in the article are primarily 
benefits accruing in the private sector, and those seeking the access are likely 
to also be in the private sector.137 It is for this reason the CBD does not 
mandate benefit-sharing as such but obliges state parties to establish a 
framework for, but allowing state parties and private parties themselves to 
arrange for, the benefit-sharing on mutually agreed terms.138 
Benefit-sharing is, however, also mentioned in article 8 paragraph (j) in 
relation to traditional knowledge. The paragraph calls on states to encourage 
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sharing of the benefits that the relevant traditional knowledge may bring 
about.139 It is clear from the wording of the paragraph that it does not demand 
that states enact domestic legislation requiring benefit-sharing with groups or 
persons holding the knowledge. Rather, states can fulfil the paragraph through 
other routes such as educating indigenous and local communities on how to 
negotiate the benefit-sharing agreements and making the holders of the 
knowledge aware of the value of the knowledge outside of the community.140 
1.8 Nagoya Protocol 
The access and benefit-sharing regime envisioned in the CBD was slow to 
take off on a domestic level.141 Prior to the adoption of the CBD there was 
hardly any experience of ABS142 and the vagueness of the relevant articles in 
the CBD coupled with the potential far-reaching effect of introducing ABS 
resulted in little implementation of ABS on a domestic level.143 To address 
the situation the sixth ordinary meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the 
CBD adopted the Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair 
and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization.144 
While the Bonn Guidelines were non-binding,145 they were adopted to guide 
governments in taking ABS measures.146 The Bonn Guidelines aimed at 
clarifying obligations for both users as well as provides of genetic resources 
to provide a transparent framework. To accomplish this goal, the Bonn 
Guidelines identified, inter alia, requirements for mutually agreed terms,147 
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aspects and principles of prior informed consent important to both providers 
and users of genetic resources,148 and the importance of involving all 
stakeholders in making the access and benefit-sharing arrangements.149 
However, the failure to adopt domestic legislation and measures regarding 
ABS led to the decision at the World Summit on Sustainable Development to 
launch negotiations regarding an international regime on the sharing of 
benefits from the utilization of genetic resources.150 The decision prompted 
the negotiations that resulted in the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic 
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their 
Utilisation to the Convention on Biological Diversity (hereinafter Nagoya 
Protocol).151  
1.8.1 Scope and objective of the Nagoya Protocol 
The Nagoya Protocol make the third objective of the CBD (the fair and 
equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic 
resources) operational.152 Its objective is fair and equitable benefit-sharing 
contributing to the conservation of biodiversity and the sustainable use of the 
components of biodiversity.153 There are, however, divergent views as for the 
meaning of fair and equitable. While it was noted, already in relation to the 
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CBD, that the terms were vague and its meanings unclear,154 the Nagoya 
Protocol does not offer a clarifying contribution.155 
It is important to note that the scope of the Nagoya Protocol is slightly 
different from that of the CBD. The scope of the Nagoya Protocol includes 
that of article 15 of the CBD, but also applies in relation to benefits arising 
from the utilization of genetic resources.156 However, the term “utilization of 
genetic resources” has a specific meaning within the convention with the 
effect of excluding any activity that does not involve “research and 
development on the genetic and/or biochemical composition of genetic 
resources”.157 Note that the biochemical composition of the genetic resources 
is now included unlike in the CBD; the application of the Nagoya Protocol is 
therefore broader than that of the CBD in this concern.158 However, not all 
usages of plants and other matter are included, only those involving research 
and development on the genetic or biochemical composition are within the 
scope of the convention.159 Therefore, accessing plants for the ornamental 
plant industry will not require prior informed consent of the state providing 
the genetic resources.160 
1.8.2 Key components of the Nagoya Protocol 
The key components of the Nagoya Protocol are the provisions on access, 
benefit-sharing and compliance. The following sections will go through these 
components in turn. 
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1.8.2.1 Access and prior informed consent 
Concerning the access to genetic resources the Nagoya Protocol, like the 
CBD, establish that states have sovereign rights over their natural resources 
and that access to genetic resources is dependent on the prior informed 
consent of the country providing the genetic resources.161 However, unlike 
the CBD, the Nagoya Protocol also sets an obligation upon these provider 
countries to adopt several measures regarding access and prior informed 
consent.162 It follows, arguably, from the relevant article that if a state fails to 
adopt the necessary measures, then no prior informed consent can be required 
and such an obligation upon the party seeking the genetic resources cannot be 
invoked.163 If this, contested, interpretation holds true, prior informed consent 
imposes obligations not only on entities seeking genetic resources in a 
providing country, but also on the providing country itself. 
The measures that must be taken by providing states regarding prior informed 
consent are many and detailed. They include obligations on providing states 
to provide “legal certainty, clarity and transparency of their domestic access 
and benefit-sharing legislation or regulatory requirements.”164 Arguably, this 
requirement could be beneficial for providing states, as it would make it easier 
for user states to fulfil their obligations on compliance (more on compliance 
below).165 Moreover, measures taken by providing states regarding access 
must include information on how to apply for prior informed consent, clear 
rules for establishing mutually agreed terms, the issuance of a permit or 
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equivalent as evidence of prior informed consent and establishment of 
mutually agreed terms.166 
1.8.2.2 Benefit-sharing 
Whereas the provision regarding prior informed consent is extensive and 
detailed the same cannot be said regarding the provision on benefit-sharing.167 
Article 5 of the Nagoya Protocol refers to paragraphs 3 and 7 of article 15 of 
the CBD but does go further. The article clarifies what actions activate the 
obligation on benefit-sharing,168 and points out, as had already been done in 
the Bonn Guidelines, that the benefits to be shared could be both of a 
monetary as well as non-monetary nature.169  
In the Nagoya Protocol, any link between access and benefit-sharing that may 
have existed in the CBD (see passage regarding said link on page 32) is at 
least less explicit in the Nagoya Protocol than it was in the CBD. With access 
and benefit-sharing dealt with in two separate articles it has been argued that 
the Nagoya Protocol could be interpreted so to mean that there is compliance 
when there is a lack of prior informed consent but mutually agreed upon terms 
for benefit-sharing.170 What the separation of access and benefit-sharing does 
affect are situations where genetic resources were accessed before prior 
informed consent was obligatory. Any subsequent benefits arising from the 
accessed genetic resources after the entry into force of the Nagoya Protocol 
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must be shared with the country providing the genetic resources, regardless 
of prior informed consent.171 
The Nagoya Protocol, furthermore, adds value to benefit-sharing by directly 
linking it to the conservation of biodiversity.172 The Nagoya Protocol 
recognizes that assigning an economic value to biodiversity, the fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits arising from that value can (and should) 
contribute to the preservation of biodiversity.173 Examples of such benefits 
aimed at the preservation of biodiversity can be viewed in the annex to the 
Nagoya protocol and include fees paid to trust funds supporting the 
preservation of biodiversity,174 transfer to the provider of genetic resources of 
technology relevant for the conservation of biodiversity,175 and transfer of 
scientific information applicable  to the preservation of biological diversity.176 
The Nagoya Protocol also contains a provision regarding a multilateral 
benefit-sharing mechanism in article 10.177 However, the article mandates 
parties to the Nagoya Protocol to consider the need for such a mechanism 
rather than mandating the establishment of such a mechanism. In any case, 
the multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism would only relate to benefits 
arising out of the use of genetic resources that occur in transboundary 
situations or where prior informed consent could not be obtained.178 No such 
system has been created to date and it is far too early to discuss it, its effects 
and how it would work alongside the bilateral system set up in the CBD and 
Nagoya Protocol. 
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1.8.2.3 Compliance 
The articles regarding compliance are perhaps the most far-reaching and 
innovative in the Nagoya Protocol. They are mindful of the problems that 
may arise once genetic information has been extracted from a provider 
country without prior informed consent or mutually agreed terms regarding 
benefit-sharing. The relevant articles in the Nagoya Protocol concerning 
compliance are primarily articles 15 through 18. Article 15.1 obligates states 
to monitor the users of genetic resources within the state’s jurisdiction and 
take measures to ensure that such genetic resources have been access in 
accordance with the domestic legislation on ABS in the providing state that 
is party to the Nagoya Protocol. 179 Article 16.1 is similar to article 15.1 but 
require states to monitor and ensure that domestic legislation in the providing 
state regarding ABS in relation to traditional knowledge are also complied 
with. Both articles also require states with users of genetic resources within 
their jurisdiction to take measures to address non-compliance with their 
respective first paragraphs,180 and to cooperate with other parties to the 
Nagoya Protocol in “cases of alleged violation of domestic [ABS] 
legislation”.181 
Article 18 of the Nagoya Protocol concerns the resolution of disputes 
grounded on the non-compliance with mutually agreed upon terms. Its 
foundations lie in the concern of providing states that some users of genetic 
resources may misuse their access, not follow through with the benefit-
sharing or in any other way breach the terms stipulated in the mutually agreed 
terms.182 The article recognizes that the mutually agreed terms will likely be 
established in a private contract between the provider and the user of the 
wanted genetic resources.183 To help facilitate the enforcement of such a 
contract the article obligates states to encourage parties of the mutually agreed 
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terms to include provisions regarding jurisdiction, applicable law and 
alternative resolution of disputes.184 To, further, facilitate dispute resolution, 
article 18 mandate states to give parties to mutually agreed terms an 
opportunity to seek recourse within the state’s legal system.185 Moreover, 
states must take, effective, measures concerning access to justice and “the 
utilization of mechanisms regarding mutual recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments and arbitral awards.”186 
Article 17 of the Nagoya Protocol establishes obligations upon states to adopt 
measures in order to monitor the utilization of genetic resources and to 
improve transparency in relation to the utilization of genetic resources. The 
article sets out specific measures to be taken by contracting parties such as 
providing one, or more, checkpoints that will collect information, from users 
of genetic resources, regarding prior informed consent, sources of genetic 
resources, mutually agreed terms and the use of the genetic resources.187 
Information gathered by the checkpoints shall be forwarded to relevant 
domestic authorities, the providing state and the Access and Benefit-sharing 
Clearing-House.188 Furthermore, article 17 provides for the possibility of 
having a permit issued in accordance with article 6.3(e) of the Nagoya 
Protocol serve as an “internationally recognized certificate of compliance”.189 
Such a certificate would provide evidence of the genetic resources having 
been accessed with prior informed consent and upon mutually agreed terms, 
in compliance with the domestic legislation of the providing state.190 
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1.9 The FAO Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources 
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(ITPRGFA)191 was adopted by the Conference of the Food and Agricultural 
Organization of the UN in 2001, nine years after the adoption of the CBD, 
and nine years before the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol. The ITPGRFA 
currently has 131 contracting parties.192 The FAO view the ITPGRFA as a 
safeguard for food security, as a large diversity in crops helps preserve yield 
stability and helps crops retain their ability to resist pests and diseases.193 
The foundations for the ITPGRFA lie in the International Undertaking on 
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. The International 
Undertaking was a non-binding resolution adopted at the 1983 FAO 
Conference. The International Undertaking had adopted the view that plant 
genetic resources were a common heritage of mankind,194 but with the 
adoption of the legally binding CBD in 1992 there was a conflict between the 
two regarding the role of plant genetic resources.195 In order to harmonize the 
views of the FAO on plant genetic resources with the views expressed in the 
CBD a new treaty had to be adopted: the ITPRGFA. The objectives of the 
ITPRGFA are twofold: (i) “conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture” (PGRFA)” and (ii) fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing arising from the use of PGRFA.196 The link between the 
ITPRGFA and the CBD is visible in the very first article of the ITPRGFA. 
The article makes express reference to the CBD and states that the objectives 
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are to be achieved in harmony with the CBD, but also that the objectives will 
be achieved through linking the ITPGRFA to the CBD.197 
1.9.1 Scope of the ITPRGFA 
The ITPRGFA only covers “plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture”,198 and defines such resources as “any genetic material of plant 
origin of actual or potential value for food and agriculture.”199 The scope of 
the ITPRGFA is therefore much smaller than that of the CBD. While the CBD 
covers all genetic material of potential or actual value, the ITPGRFA only 
covers genetic material originating in plants,200 of potential or actual value for 
food and agriculture. It can therefore be argued that the ITPGRFA represents 
a lex specialis regarding genetic resources of plant origin in the agricultural 
field, whereas the CBD would constitute lex generalis.201 
1.9.2 Farmers’ Rights 
With its heavy focus on the conservation and sustainable use of agricultural 
biodiversity it is understandable that the ITPGRFA has a provision regarding 
farmers’ rights.202 Paragraph 1 of article 9 is in part recognition of the 
contribution of past, current and future farmers to the diversity in agricultural 
crops we see today and part rationale for the coming obligations in paragraph 
2 and 3 of the article. In paragraph 2 and 3, the article also obligates states to 
protect and promote farmers’ rights.203 The ITPGRFA does not offer a 
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comprehensive list of farmers’ rights but give examples of what such an 
obligation entails.204 
In the drafting of article 9 it was recognized that the parties to the negotiations 
were of different views as to the scope of the farmers’ rights. There is no 
agreed upon definition for farmers’ rights.205 It is by some associated with 
intellectual property protection for plant varieties developed by farmers. This 
view would entail equitable benefit-sharing on the bases of an ownership over 
the genetic resources accessed by commercial plant breeders.206 Others view 
farmers’ rights as a right to not be limited by IPRs, a right that would allow 
farmers to save, sell, re-use, exchange and propagating material they had 
harvested, regardless of plant variety protection or any other IPR on the 
harvested crops.207 Moreover, as discussed in section 3.2.1, many countries 
were now bound by international agreements that did not allow for vast 
farmers’ rights at the expense of plant breeders’ rights. Article 9.3 thusly 
states that any right to save, sell, re-use or exchange harvested propagating 
material and seeds shall not be limited by article 9. States wishing to have 
broad farmers’ rights could legislate to that effect, in compliance with the 
ITPGRFA. 
1.9.3 Multilateral System of ABS 
The truly innovative aspect of the ITPGRFA is the Multilateral System of 
ABS. The ITPGRFA recognizes that while a large genetic diversity in 
agricultural crops has a value in itself, the instrumental value of genetic 
diversity to the safeguarding food security is of higher importance.208 
However, the instrumental value of the agricultural biodiversity can only be 
realized if there is access to the preserved genetic diversity. The access is of 
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key importance as the ITPGRFA recognizes that plant breeders and farmers 
of all countries face challenges to which improved varieties may prove the 
answer. The ITPGRFA, furthermore, recognizes the costs inherent in creating 
bilateral access arrangements and comes to the simple conclusion: if all 
countries need access to genetic resources, the practical solution is to create 
a multilateral access and benefit-sharing regime.209 
The multilateral system of ABS is established in article 10.2 of the ITPGRFA. 
The System has two main purposes, to facilitate access to PGRFA and to 
establish benefit-sharing arising out of the utilization of PGRFA in a fair and 
equitable manner.210 The System has a narrow scope in that the System only 
covers PGRFA that are found in Annex I to the ITPGRFA.211 Annex I 
contains a list of 64 species of crops and forages deemed important for food 
security. The list contains such species as maize, rice, wheat, oat and 
alfalfa.212 Due to the requirement on the listed agricultural produce to be of 
importance to food security, it includes crops that serve as staple crops only 
regionally or even locally such as taro, coconut and yam.213 However, as the 
list of crops had to be adopted by consensus, many crops could not be added 
to the list such as sugarcane, tomato, soybean, coffee and tea.214 These crops, 
not appearing on the list, are therefore outside of the Multilateral System set 
up by the ITPGRFA. For some of the crops included in the list in the Annex 
I, only certain species in a genus are included in the list.215 The Governing 
Body of the ITPGRFA may introduce species to be added to the Annex I, but 
such decisions will need to be made by consensus in the Governing Body.216 
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The Multilateral System pools together the resources available in the public 
domain or held by states party to the ITPGRFA.217 Resources held by private 
entities are not included, except on a voluntary basis, as some states felt it 
would encroach upon their property rights.218 The ITPGRFA does not 
differentiate between material already held prior to the entry into force of the 
ITPGRFA and material acquired thereafter. This was aimed at the ex situ 
collections acquired without prior informed consent before such consent was 
necessary.219 The ITPGRFA also covers collections found in in situ 
conditions.220 Access to the pooled resources is only provided “for the 
purpose of utilization and conservation for research, breeding and training for 
food and agriculture.”221 Note that it is not the material itself that is of 
concern, but the use to which it is put.222 Research into non-food purposes, 
such as pharmaceutical or chemical, is not included. If the research is 
multipronged, the importance for food security should determine the crops 
inclusion or exclusion from the Multilateral System.223  
In order to gain access to the PGRFA, entities seeking access will need to 
acquiesce to a standard material transfer agreement (SMTA). The SMTA is 
set out in article 12.4 of the ITPGRFA. According to the article, access to 
genetic resources provided through the ITPGRFA shall be granted pursuant 
to a SMTA. Such an agreement shall be adopted by the Governing Body of 
the ITPGRFA and shall contain article 12.2 subparagraphs (a), (d) and (g), 
article 13.2(d)(ii) as well as other relevant provisions contained in the 
ITPGRFA.224 Thus, the SMTA must contain provision regarding use of the 
accessed material, limitation of IPRs on the accessed material and continued 
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availability of the accessed material.225 Moreover, the SMTA must contain a 
provision making the SMTA apply to future subsequent transfers.226  
As for benefit-sharing, the ITPGRFA recognizes that the access provided by 
the Multilateral System is in itself a benefit.227 Further benefits ensuing from 
the use of genetic resources for food and agriculture will be shared through 
several mechanisms: exchange of information, capacity-building, access to 
and transfer of technology, and the sharing of monetary benefits arising from 
the commercialization of plant genetic products for food and agriculture using 
material obtained through a SMTA.228 Monetary benefits arising from the 
commercialization of plant genetic resources will be accrued in a mechanism 
established by the Governing Body.229 This mechanism has since become 
known as the Benefit-sharing Fund and invests money accumulated on the 
basis of SMTAs into projects aimed at supporting farmers in the developing 
world.230 
1.9.4 Relationship between ITPGRFA and the 
Nagoya Protocol 
It was previously stated that the ITPGRFA could be viewed as lex specialis 
in relation to the CBD, but what of its relationship with the Nagoya Protocol? 
Article 4.4 of the Nagoya Protocol was adopted with the ITPGRFA in 
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mind.231 According to article 4.4 of the Nagoya Protocol, countries that are 
party to a specialized ABS instrument, that is not running counter to the 
objectives of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, shall not apply the Nagoya 
Protocol in relation to the genetic resources and material covered by, and for 
the purposes of, the more specialized instrument. Moreover, in article 4.3 the 
Nagoya Protocol states that it shall be implemented in a mutually supportive 
manner with other relevant instruments. Article 4.1, furthermore, states that 
the Nagoya Protocol does not mean to create a hierarchy between itself and 
other international instruments, thereby circumventing article 30.2 and 30.3 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.232 
From the above, it seems clear that PGRFA that are included in the list found 
in Annex I to the ITPGRFA and where access is for utilization in research or 
development in food and agriculture, are outside of the scope of the Nagoya 
Protocol for the states that are party to both instruments. 233 
However, the ITPGRFA covers all PGRFA, whereas the Multilateral System 
only covers those found in Annex I.234 Are PGRFA that is not listed in Annex 
I or where the access is not for utilization in research, or not in research for 
food and agriculture then covered by the ITPGRFA or the Nagoya Protocol? 
It is arguable that, as they are not included in the Multilateral System, the 
PGRFA not listed in Annex I are not covered by an international ABS 
instrument,235 similarly would be the case when access is not for the purposes 
set out in article 12.3(a) of the ITPGRFA.  Therefore, the exception in article 
4.4 of the Nagoya Protocol would not apply, whereas the Nagoya Protocol 
would. 
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As for situations where a state party to the ITPGRFA provides access to a 
state not party to the ITPGRFA the Nagoya Protocol does not apply. From 
the wording of article 4.4 of the Nagoya Protocol, one can draw the 
conclusions that it is not necessary that both the provider and recipient of the 
PGRFA are parties to the ITPGRFA.236 Therefore, the ITPGRFA will apply 
when the provider of the PGRFA is party to the ITPGRFA, but the recipient 
is not. 
1.10 A Summary  
Three instruments cover the issue of ABS, the CBD, the Nagoya Protocol and 
the ITPGRFA. The CBD has entered into force and is applicable to 194 states, 
with notable exception being Andorra, the United States and the Holy See.237 
The Nagoya Protocol has not entered into force yet having only acquired 33 
ratifications.238 The ITPGRFA on the other hand has acquired sufficient 
ratifications and has entered into effect for the 131 contracting parties to the 
ITPGRFA.239 The interrelationship between the instruments can be 
complicated. As shown above, the Nagoya Protocol submits itself to the lex 
specialis nature of the ITPGRFA in relation to PGRFA included in Annex I 
of the ITPGRFA. In relation to PGRFA not included in the list in Annex I, 
which the Multilateral System set out by the ITPGRFA does not cover, the 
Nagoya Protocol will be applicable for states that have acquiesced to the 
Nagoya Protocol, once the Nagoya Protocol enters into force.  
Much the same can be said for the relationship between the ITPGRFA and 
the CBD. The ITPGRFA removes the option of having the ITPGRFA 
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supersede the CBD due to it being lex posterior.240 However, since the 
ITPGRFA regulates a subset of the scope of the CBD, namely PGRFA, it acts 
as lex specialis for the relevant subset as long as it complies with the CBD.241 
Which instrument to apply in any given circumstance will depend on the 
parties involved, the nature of the genetic resources as well as the intended 
use of the genetic resources, as explained above. 
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Motivations behind ABS 
De Jonge identifies six different motivations that characterize different 
approaches to benefit-sharing. These are: 
1. The North-South divide, and in particular the divide in the allocation 
and exploitation of biodiversity 
2. So-called biopiracy and a perceived imbalance in IPRs 
3. A protection of local and indigenous communities and in particular 
their cultural identity 
4. Food security 
5. The conservation of biodiversity 
6. A perceived imbalance between IPRs and public interest 242 
According to De Jonge, the first approach recognizes that developing 
countries, rich in biodiversity, do not have the resources to invest into the 
biotechnology industry to exploit their resources. Instead, it is the developed 
countries, poor in biodiversity, which can invest the necessary resources into, 
and benefit from, the biotechnology industry.243 By including genetic 
resources into the principle of national sovereignty over natural resources, the 
CBD allows states providing genetic resources to negotiate mutually agreed 
terms, which can include fair and equal benefit-sharing.244 Thus, the ABS 
regime set out in the CBD allows for the fair compensation for providing 
genetic resources.245 
The second approach focuses on the imbalance created by IPRs. It is argued 
that IPRs cannot offer protection for developments made in the developing 
world. Patents exclude most traditional knowledge since it often lacks a 
particular author, or because it lacks the requirements of novelty and 
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inventive step.246 Moreover, the requirements on plant varieties to gain 
protection are often too onerous for farmers to acquire protection.247 Instead, 
entities in the developed world build upon the unprotected traditional 
knowledge or the unprotected plant varieties to create something that can be 
protected by IPRs.248 With an ABS regime in place, states could request 
compensation for the advances made based on resources or knowledge gained 
in the developing world that cannot otherwise be protected. 
However, protecting indigenous communities’ traditional knowledge also 
involves giving them a seat at the negotiating table as well as giving them the 
tools to negotiate fairly with the seeker of the genetic resources.249 At the 
same time, the culture of many communities are foreign to the idea of 
ownership of land and natural resources, even more so to ownership of genetic 
resources. The negotiations will be framed in terms foreign to indigenous 
groups who perhaps cannot fathom the potential value of the knowledge or 
resources that the rest of the world views as theirs.250 Arguably, the threat to 
cultural diversity constitutes a threat to biodiversity if we consider cultural 
diversity as a source of biological diversity.251 It should be noted that this 
motivation expressly targets individuals and groups of individuals and not 
just states. 
The ITPGRFA expresses the fourth approach. The ITPGRFA states that its 
aim is the conservation of PGRFA and fair and equitable sharing of benefits 
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arising from its use for sustainable agriculture and food security.252 Moreover, 
the ITPGRFA recognizes that access to PGRFA is in itself a benefit of the 
Multilateral System it sets up,253 and recognizes that further benefits ensuing 
from the System shall be directed towards farmers, and in particular to 
farmers in developing countries and countries with economies in transition.254 
However, the benefits accrued through the System do not necessarily have to 
benefit farmers directly. Rather, the benefits must support the objectives of 
the ITPGRFA: sustainable agriculture and food security.255  
It should however be noted that the issue of biodiversity and food was 
recognized already in the CBD, and was an expressed purpose behind ABS 
as set up by the Convention.256 The concerns regarding food security in the 
CBD does not relate to farmers in the way the ITPGRFA does. The CBD 
envisions bilateral benefit-sharing, between the provider and user of genetic 
resources, except for indigenous and local communities.257 On the other hand, 
the benefit-sharing envisioned by the ITPGRFA is more directly linked at 
farmers and other persons preserving the diversity in PGRFA. 
ABS is also founded upon the motivation that it will help conserve biological 
diversity.258 By preserving biodiversity, states have more opportunities to 
receive benefit-sharing from parties seeking their genetic resources. In this 
way, ABS serves as an incentive for the conservation of biodiversity.259 
The last approach relates to the power invested into IPRs who actually 
benefits from the application of the inventions and developments. The issue 
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lies in the fact that most of the research is conducted in and for the developed 
world.260 Benefits arising from research conducted in the private sector may 
lead to improvements for farmers in developing countries as well, in the form 
of spillover effects. Moreover, the IPRs can block further research by 
preventing persons and entities from, freely, using already protected 
material.261 In this sense, De Jonge argues that ABS is less about 
compensation, but aims at the “equitable distribution of the benefits of 
modern research and development.”262 
No doubt, there was no one single reason behind the decision to adopt an ABS 
regime in the CBD. However, prior to the adoption of the CBD the view put 
forward in the International Undertaking, that all plant genetic resources were 
a common heritage of mankind,263 was the commonly accepted view.264 The 
view that plant genetic resources were a common heritage of mankind had 
proven beneficial to the developed countries while providing little benefit to 
the developing world.265 The plant genetic resources freely available under 
the doctrine of common heritage of mankind could be used to gain IPR. 
Material gained freely in the South was  used to modify plants that then would 
gain protection through the international IPR regime, from the very people 
providing the raw material.266 As Henry Vogel put it: “In the case of genetic 
resources, Northern industry [was] able to privatize the benefits of 
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biotechnologies that derive from these resources, while socializing the costs 
of access.”267  
The expected increase in value of plant genetic resources due to the expansion 
of biotechnology can then explain the resolve of developing states to 
admonish the principle of common heritage of mankind with regards to plant 
genetic resources in favour of the principle of national sovereignty over 
natural resources.268 
The initial move of IPRs from the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) to the WTO was mainly due to two reasons: dissatisfaction with 
negotiations in WIPO and institutional features of WTO making it more 
favourable for developed states.269 The institutional features include an 
effective dispute settlement, the stronger position of developed states in the 
WTO and the increased likelihood that developing states would accept 
stronger protection for IPRs offered as part of a greater, beneficial package.270 
The strong protection over IPRs offered in the TRIPs Agreement and the 
difficulty in amending existing agreements made developing states look 
elsewhere in an attempt to alter their obligations.271 By linking IPRs with 
issues of human rights, in a move similar to the linking of IPRs and trade, 
developing states have attempted to alter their obligations under the TRIPs 
Agreement and other instruments in the field of intellectual property,272 such 
as the inclusion of farmers’ rights in the ITPGRFA.273 In some areas the 
developments have not altered the obligations but rather set out additional 
duties more in line with the objectives of developing countries such as the 
recommendation in the Bonn Guidelines to “encourage the disclosure of the 
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country of origin of the genetic resources and […] traditional knowledge […] 
in applications for IPRs.”274  
The regime shifting described above can also be attributed to the view that 
the WTO is an “international institution perpetuating Western hegemony over 
the rest of the world.”275 The interests of the United States and the European 
Community essentially drove the Uruguay round of negotiations that would 
lead to the formation of the WTO.276 Compromises promised in the 
negotiations in order to get developing countries to agree to the proposals 
were not carried out.277 In the end, the developing countries could either agree 
to the entire package that is the WTO, or none of it.278 However, making the 
WTO a single undertaking came at a price: decision-making.279 The decision-
making in the WTO was contested, but the outcome was that decisions are to 
be made by consensus, or, if that fails, a vote where each contracting party 
has one vote.280 
Arguably, the impact of the WTO and its covered agreements affected 
developing countries to a greater extent than developed countries.281 The 
concessions made by developing states include tariff cuts larger than that of 
developed states and inclusion of service and intellectual property into the 
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WTO.282 Developed states, however, also had to make concessions. Two 
areas of importance to developing countries, where they have an advantage 
over developed countries, were included under the WTO: agriculture and 
textile.283 These agreements would however do little to stop continued 
protectionism from developed countries. Tariffs in developed countries target 
goods and products of relevance to developing countries.284 The UNDP found 
that tariffs on goods from low-income developing countries to high-income 
countries were three to four times as high as tariffs on goods between high-
income countries.285 Along the same vein, it found that “developing countries 
account for less than one-third of developed country imports but for two-
thirds of tariff revenues collected.”286 Similarly, tariffs in developed countries 
are not conducive to development; often tariffs for a raw product are lower 
than for a processed product.287 
It has been said that “there are makers, breakers and takers of international 
institutions: developed countries are the makers, developing countries are the 
takers”.288 This echoes the opinion, expressed earlier in the introduction, that 
in international law making, the third world are recipients, not participants.289 
However, for the weaker powers, i.e. the developing countries, having rules 
and institutions in place that give some predictability may seem worth the 
disadvantageous agreements to be endured as the price for institutions.290 
With no rules there is no predictability and the developing world is still likely 
to face unfavourable conditions.291 
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The situation of the CBD is similar to that of the WTO. Concerning the 
obligation to conserve biodiversity, it is clear that states with more 
biodiversity face a larger, and more costly, challenge than that of states with 
less biodiversity.292 Of the 17 most biologically diverse countries, only two 
belong to the group of developed countries.293 The burden of conserving 
biodiversity is then larger on the developing world. One of the motivations 
behind the ABS regime set out in the CBD was to counteract the uneven 
burden of conservation. However, whereas the CBD sets out extensive 
obligations regarding conservation, the articles on access and benefit-sharing 
leave room for discretion for states.294 The lack of implementation of the ABS 
regime led to the adoption of the Bonn Guidelines as well as the Nagoya 
Protocol that is aimed at operationalizing the third objective of the CBD: 
benefit-sharing. However, it only took the CBD 18 months to enter into force 
and 194 states have now acquiesced to the CBD.295 Only 34 states have 
acquiesced to the Nagoya Protocol since its adoption in 2010; mainly 
developing countries.296 It has been argued that the Nagoya Protocol suffers 
from similar problems as the CBD does in relation to the North-South divide. 
The interests of the developed countries once again prevailed as can be seen 
in the detailed rules on access (as was an interest of the developed countries) 
and the vague rules regarding compliance.297 
The effective operation of the ABS regime envisioned in the CBD in a state 
may not rely on the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol, but perhaps the low 
interest in becoming bound by the norms contained in the Nagoya Protocol is 
an indication of state compliance with the ABS regime. 
                                                 
292 Glowka et al, supra note 110, page 1. 
293 See text in note 109. 
294 Glowka et al, supra note 110, pages 3 and 5. 
295 Glowka et al, supra note 110, page ix.  
296 Number according to http://www.cbd.int/abs/nagoya-protocol/signatories/default.shtml 
[accessed 2014-05-07]. Notable developed countries among those 34 are Norway 
(ratification on 1 October 2013) and Denmark (approval on 1 May 2014). 
297 Nijar, supra note 136, at page 27. Compare also Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic 
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilisation to 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 151, articles 6 and 15-17 . 
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The effects of ABS on farmers 
In relation to intellectual property protection and the right to food it is 
important to note that the main concerns relate to access to the means of 
producing food,298 a decrease in the agricultural biodiversity,299 and the 
privatization of agricultural research.300 It is unlikely that IPRs will directly 
deprive a person of the means of producing food.301 IPRs on plant varieties 
can only restrict certain usages of that plant variety. Farmers may still use 
non-protected plant varieties as they see fit. Indirect effects on the access to 
the means of producing food of IPRs on plant varieties include a lack of non-
protected seeds available at seed companies, and increased prices for seeds.302 
With regard to the potential decrease in agricultural biodiversity, the 
ITPGRFA identifies the interdependency of all states on the agricultural 
diversity as a means of solving agricultural problems in the past and in the 
future.303 The prohibition on the exchange of seeds, found in the UPOV 
Convention, forces farmers to reuse only seeds they have harvested on their 
own land or to buy new seeds.304 This could have negative effects on 
agricultural biodiversity, particularly if the plant variety is hybrid, 305 due to 
the loss of hybrid vigour.306 Moreover, the strength of the protected varieties 
outcompetes traditional varieties; in France 600 protected plant varieties 
                                                 
298 UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Report to the UN Commission on Human 
Rights, supra note 30, para 73. 
299 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, supra note 
191, preamble, paragraphs 3, 4 and 6. 
300 Haugen, supra note 18, page 408. 
301 Haugen, supra note 18, page 417. 
302 Haugen, supra note 18, page 410. 
303 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, supra note 
191, preamble, paragraph 3 and Moore and Tymowski, supra note 193, pages 4-6. 
304 See above under chapter 3.2.1. 
305 Hybrids gain benefits due to so called heterosis or hybrid vigour which is a 
“phenomenon that describes the survival and performance superiority of a hybrid offspring 
over the average of both its genetically distinct parents.” Baranwal, Vinay Kumar, et al. 
“Heterosis: Emerging Ideas About Hybrid Vigour.” In Journal Of Experimental Botany, 
vol. 63, issue 18, 2012, pages  6309-6314, at page 6309. 
306 Pingali, P.L. and Traxler, G., “Changing locus of agricultural research: will the poor 
benefit from biotechnology and privatization trends?”, Food Policy, vol. 27, issue 3, June 
2002, pages 223-238, at page 234. 
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represent 99% of all plant varieties grown, 1% of all plant varieties grown in 
France are not protected by IPRs.307 
 There are several issues related to the privatization of research. Having 
private entities conduct most of the research means that inventions and 
knowledge will accumulate outside of the public domain and that it will target 
economically viable crops at the expense of less economically viable crops.308 
This could create neglected crops that will be similar to the more well-known 
“neglected diseases” in that the projected revenue is not large enough to 
warrant the projected costs of research and development.309 It should also be 
noted that the interest in creating hybrid plant varieties that lose their hybrid 
vigour means that there will be a lack in research on plant varieties that does 
not lose their hybrid vigour.310  
Moreover it is likely that private entities will conduct research on crop 
management in economically viable environments and ecological regions 
resulting in “high location specificity of agronomic and crop management 
knowledge and technologies” that does not apply across ecological 
boundaries.311 
The result is that most of the private research will go into crops not suitable 
for developing countries and private crop management research will focus on 
the environment and ecological region of the developed countries. Primarily, 
the public sector has been left to care for the farmers of the developing 
world.312 
                                                 
307 Shiva, Vandana, “GM seed patents pose dire threat to food -- and democracy”, CCPA 
Monitor, vol. 19, issue 1, May 2012, pages 36-37, at page 36. 
308 Mechlem and Raney, supra note 3, page 145. 
309 Mechlem and Raney, supra note 3, page 145. For more on “neglected diseases” see 
Moran, Mary, et al. “Neglected Disease Research And Development: How Much Are We 
Really Spending?.”, Public Library of Science Medicine, vol 6, issue 2, pages 0137-0146, 
and Trouiller, Patrice, Olliaro, Piero, Torreele, Els, Orbinski, James, Laing, Richard, and 
Ford, Nathan, “Drug Development For Neglected Diseases: A Deficient Market And A 
Public-Health Policy Failure.”, Lancet vol. 359, issue 9324, 2002, pages  2188-2194. 
310 Pingali and Traxler, supra note 306, at page 234. 
311 Ibid, at page 235. 
312 FAO, supra note 260, page 105 Mechlem and Raney, supra note 3, page 145. 
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The Nagoya Protocol recognizes that ABS is not an end goal in itself, but 
rather ABS is a measure that can help achieving the goal of conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity.313 ABS then, when viewed together 
with the undue burden upon the biodiversity rich developing states to 
conserve their biodiversity,314 becomes an important tool in the struggle to 
preserve biological diversity. However, whereas the CBD, and the Nagoya 
Protocol in extension, view biological diversity as something with intrinsic 
value, as well as instrumental and inherent value,315 the ITPGRFA view 
biological diversity as instrumentally valuable in its potential to safeguard 
food security and sustainable agriculture.316  
Given the differing views on the type of value of biodiversity it is not 
surprising that the ITPGRFA includes an article on farmers’ rights, whereas 
neither the CBD nor the Nagoya Protocol does. It also explains why the CBD 
and the Nagoya Protocol envisions bilateral benefit-sharing, leaving any 
further benefit-sharing to the persons who have created the existing biological 
diversity in a state for that state to determine. The obligation to conserve the 
existing biological diversity in line with the CBD conveys obligations upon 
the states party to the Convention. Benefit-sharing in the CBD, as explained 
above, is used as an incentive for states to alleviate the burden of conserving 
biodiversity, it is not meant to alleviate the burdens of individuals.317 
1.11 CBD and Nagoya Protocol 
As was said above, the CBD envisions inter-state benefit-sharing, or at least 
benefit-sharing to the providing state by a party seeking access to genetic 
resources. However, benefits given to states may provide benefits to 
individuals as well, including farmers in the developing world. Many of the 
                                                 
313 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits Arising from Their Utilisation to the Convention on Biological Diversity, supra 
note 151, article 6.1, and Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 106, articles 1. 
314 See Glowka et al, supra note 110, page 1. 
315 Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 106, preamble, paragraph 1. 
316 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, supra note 
191, preamble paragraphs 4 and 6, and article 1. 
317 Glowka et al, supra note 110, pages 1 and 3. 
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benefits listed in Appendix II to the Bonn Guidelines will not directly benefit 
farmers in developing countries; rather, the benefit-sharing may have indirect 
effects for farmers. Some of the benefits that may directly affect farmers 
include providing contributions to the local economy and providing food and 
livelihood security.318 Indirect contributions include providing research 
directed towards food security, sharing research, and capacity building on 
various levels.319 However, only local and indigenous groups will be able to 
affect, directly, the mutually agreed terms due to the requirement of their 
approval and only in regards to so called traditional knowledge.320 Arguably, 
this introduces State-to-community benefit-sharing into the inter-state 
benefit-sharing regime the CBD otherwise embodies.321 Other farmers will 
essentially depend on the goodwill of the parties to the mutually agreed terms 
or the providing state.322  
The Nagoya Protocol not yet amassed enough support for to enter into effect. 
Any assessment regarding its effectiveness and application will therefore be 
theoretical.  
Many of the non-monetary benefits envisioned in the Bonn Guidelines and 
the Nagoya Protocol regard transfer of technology. However, there are 
inherent problems with the transfer of technology, as has been described 
above in relation to the developed world as the locus of research and 
knowledge. The transfer of technology, be it know-how or seeds, is many 
times dependent on factors such a location, environment and regional climate, 
but also capital and infrastructure, and may therefore not be useful to all 
recipients.323 Furthermore, as the Conference of the Parties to the CBD 
                                                 
318 Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the 
Benefits Arising out of their Utilization, supra note 144, Appendix II, paragraph 2(l) and 
(o). 
319 Ibid, Appendix II, paragraph 2(a), (g), (h), (i) and (m). 
320 Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 106, article 8(j).  
321 Morgera, Buck, and Tsioumani, supra note 116, page 4. 
322 Note that the Bonn Guidelines in paragraph 48 advocates the sharing of benefits to all 
those that have contributed to  
323 Pingali and Traxler, supra note 306, at page 235 and FAO, supra note 260, page 104. 
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emphasized,324 IPRs must be supportive of the objectives of the Convention 
and not run counter to them.325 It has been argued that an adoption of 
intellectual property protection standard similar to that of the TRIPs 
Agreement would increase the willingness to transfer protected 
technology.326 However, it may not always be in the best interest of 
developing countries to acquiesce to and adopt the standards set out in the 
TRIPs Agreement. 
 Article 19 of the CBD obligates all parties to take measures to ensure the 
“effective participation” in biotechnological research of the state providing 
the genetic resources.327 This could combat the problems that come from 
having research and knowledge accumulate in the developed world. An 
“effective participation” on behalf of the states providing genetic resources 
could encourage research using the provided genetic material on crops more 
suitable to the area in which the genetic material stems from. Moreover, 
research could target agronomic and crop management techniques more 
befitting the local environment and ecosystem. However, while research and 
development may lead to innovations that will benefit farmers it is important 
to remember that many farmers are among the most poor in the world. There 
must be conscious efforts made so that farmers can actually benefit from the 
innovations; placing new inventions or developed knowledge into the public 
domain is not, in itself, enough. 
It is uncertain to what extent farmers can benefit from monetary benefits. 
Similar to non-monetary benefits, it is likely that the state rather than 
individual farmers will accrue the benefits gathered through mutually agreed 
terms. It will then be for the state to disperse the accumulated benefits if 
farmers are to benefit from them. As such, the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol 
                                                 
324 Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Review of National, 
Regional and Sectoral Measures and Guidelines for Implementation of Article 15, 
UNEP/CBD/COP/4/23, 19 Feb. 1998, para 16. 
325 Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 106, article 16(5). See also Convention 
on Biological Diversity, supra note 106, article 16(2). 
326 see Lawson and Downing, supra note 8, at page 225. 
327 Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 106, article 19(1). See also Convention 
on Biological Diversity, supra note 106, article 15(6). 
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will likely have little direct effect for farmers; there is a need for the state to 
further share the benefits accrued. Indirect effects for famers may include 
monetary gains that, were it not for the ABS regime, would not exist. 
However, the monetary benefits shared with provider countries may be 
invested into research and development benefitting the farmers of that state. 
It is not necessary that monetary benefits to a state are transferred to farmers 
in the form of monetary benefits. 
It must be noted that the Bonn Guidelines does not provide a complete list of 
available ways to share benefits. Similarly, the Nagoya Protocol copies, 
verbatim, the list of benefits provided in Appendix II to the Bonn Guidelines 
and expressly states that benefits are not limited to the listed ones.328 
However, whereas the Nagoya Protocol operationalizes the ABS regime set 
out in the CBD, it still suffers similar problems in that ABS is still a bilateral 
issue between the provider and user of genetic resources.329 Moreover, the 
Nagoya Protocol enforces the view that only local or indigenous communities 
can directly affect and benefit from benefit-sharing.330 
Evaluating the effectiveness and the justice of international law from a third 
world approach means that one must look at the effects of the legislation upon 
the people of the states that are party to the instruments. Anghie and Chimni 
point out that “Third World states often act in ways that are against the 
interests of their people.”331 Thus, benefit-sharing where the people are tasked 
to conserve biodiversity without actually benefitting from the use of the 
conserved biodiversity cannot be just. It is therefore imperative that the 
benefit-sharing that states accrue are further shared with the people of that 
state. 
                                                 
328 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits Arising from Their Utilisation to the Convention on Biological Diversity, supra 
note 151, article 6.1, and Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 106, article 5(4). 
329 Ibid, article 5(1). 
330 Ibid, article 6.1, and Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 106, article 5(2) 
and (5). 
331 Anghie, Antony, and B. S. Chimni. “Third World Approaches To International Law And 
Individual Responsibility In Internal Conflict”, in Studies In Transnational Legal Policy, 
vol. 36, 2004, pages 185-210, at page 186. 
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1.12 ITPGRFA 
The benefit-sharing envisioned in the ITPGRFA is different from that of the 
CBD or the Nagoya Protocol. A bilateral agreement between the provider of 
PGRFA covered by the Multilateral System of ABS and the user of such 
genetic resources must be in place, but the SMTA adopted by the Governing 
Body for the ITPGRFA reduces the need for negotiations. The SMTA also 
provides for when benefits by the user party to the SMTA shall be shared.332 
In accordance with the SMTA, use of PGRFA covered by the Multilateral 
System may require compensation. Compensation shall be paid when the 
recipient commercializes a “product that is a PGRFA” that makes use of 
material transferred pursuant to the SMTA and restricts further research and 
breeding on the product.333 When the above requirements are fulfilled, but the 
product is available, without restriction, for further research and breeding, 
then the SMTA encourages recipients to make voluntary payments.334 
According to the SMTA a product is “available without restriction” when 
there is no “legal or contractual obligations, or technological restrictions” 
preventing the product from being used in the manner specified in the 
ITPGRFA.335 The negotiation history of the ITPGRFA provides that a 
product protected in a manner that would present “practical, legal or physical” 
restrictions to the availability of the product would require mandatory 
payments if the other requirements are also fulfilled.336 Acquiring protection 
of a level equal to that prescribed by the UPOV Convention would not require 
mandatory payments.337 Patent protection may in some cases prompt 
mandatory compensation.338 
                                                 
332 See Report of the Governing Body of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture, supra note 228, article 6.7, 6.8 and 6.11.  
333 Ibid, article 6.7. See also International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture, supra note 191, article 13.2(d)(ii) 
334 Report of the Governing Body of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture, supra note 228, article 6.8. 
335 Ibid, article 2. 
336 Moore and Tymowski, supra note 193, page 111. 
337 Moore and Tymowski, supra note 193, page 111. 
338 Moore and Tymowski, supra note 193, page 111. 
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The payments mandated in the SMTA shall be 0.77 per cent of the gross 
income resulting from the commercialization,339 and shall be paid to the 
Benefit-sharing Fund established by the Governing Body for the 
ITPGRFA.340 It should be noted that as of 2012 the SMTA had yet to generate 
any income to the Benefit-sharing Fund,341 and the projects which the Fund 
carried out in 2010-2011 was financed by donations from four parties to the 
ITPGRFA.342 
The projects that the fund invests in are closely related to farmers. Funded 
projects must relate to one or more challenge identified as safeguarding 
biodiversity, food security, and climate change. Priority is given to projects 
related to “information exchange, technology transfer and capacity 
development”, “on-farm management and conservation of crop diversity“, 
and “sustainable use of crop diversity”.343 However, there are several 
problems facing the Benefit-sharing Fund. These problems affect the amount 
of monetary benefits it can accrue and invest. Projected payments to the 
Benefit-sharing fund range from US$10 million to US$39 million annually in 
the year 2030.344  The problems are not insurmountable and include acquiring 
new members to the ITPGRFA with large gene-banks, avoidance by 
institution of using genetic resources covered by the Multilateral System, a 
lack of research into crops included in Annex 1 to the ITPGRFA.345 It will 
still be some time before the Benefit-sharing Fund, reliably, can invest 
monetary benefits accrued into projects affecting farmers. 
Moreover, the parties to the ITPGRFA undertake to share non-monetary 
benefits arising out of the utilization of PGRFA covered by the Multilateral 
                                                 
339 Report of the Governing Body of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture, supra note 228, article 2 and Annex 2, paragraph 1. 
340 Ibid, Annex 2, paragraph 4. 
341 FAO, Identifying Benefit Flows: Studies on the Potential Monetary and Non-Monetary 
Benefits Arising from the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture, FAO, Rome, 2013, page xxix. 
342 FAO, Report on the First Round of the Project Cycle of the Benefit-sharing Fund, FAO, 
Rome, 2013, page 10. 
343 Ibid, page 12. 
344 FAO, supra note 341, page xxiii. 
345 FAO, supra note 341, page xxiii-xxv 
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System through the exchange of information, transfer of technology and 
capacity building.346 The Global Information System envisioned in article 17 
of the ITPGRFA and using international organization (including the CGIAR 
Centres) to strengthen regional networks and increase national capacities, 
especially in developing countries.347 Similar problems as has been described 
above regarding the transfer of technology may arise here as well. 
The ITPGRFA also considers the facilitated access to PGRFA to be a benefit, 
in and of itself.348 The SMTA provides a multilateral option that removes the 
need to negotiate for prior informed consent and mutually agreed terms. It is 
thus likely to decrease costs for entities seeking PGRFA.349 The agreements 
entered into between the CGIAR International Agricultural Research Centres 
and the Governing Body for the ITPGRFA provide for facilitated access to 
the ex-situ holdings of CGIAR, which include varieties improved by the 
Research Centres.350 
                                                 
346 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, supra note 
191, article 13.2. 
347 Ibid, article 17, and FAO, Identifying Benefit Flows: Studies on the Potential Monetary 
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Resources for Food and Agriculture, FAO, Rome, 2013, page 26. 
348 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, supra note 
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Conclusion 
This thesis set out to answer the questions of whether or not farmers are likely 
to see and benefits from the ABS regimes and in what form those benefits 
would be. 
It has been nearly 20 years since the adoption of the ABS regime envisioned 
in the CBD. In that time, Guidelines for the fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits in accordance with the CBD and two new international instruments 
regarding ABS has been adopted. Similarly, the intellectual property regime 
has evolved and the most important instrument on intellectual property is 
currently under the administration of the WTO in the shape of the TRIPs 
Agreement. However, whereas the effectiveness of the WTO system, due in 
large part to the Dispute Settlement Understanding, is recognized,351 the ABS 
regime has been a work in progress. The adoption of the Bonn Guidelines and 
the start of the negotiations that would lead to the adoption of the Nagoya 
Protocol highlight the difficulties in creating an effective ABS regime. 
Similarly, the ITPGRFA, which has more than 130 contracting parties, has 
yet to generate any payments for its benefit-sharing fund, albeit they have the 
system in place.  
The instruments discussed that are relevant for ABS are all centred around 
sovereign states. The natural resources utilized belong to sovereign states, and 
so do the right to a share of the benefits from the utilization of those natural 
resources and the obligation to conserve biological diversity. The vague 
obligations regarding benefit-sharing suggests that developing countries did 
not get all they wanted in return for the obligations to conserve biological 
diversity and provide access to their genetic resources. However, it is 
important to also look at the persons in these developing countries and how 
they are affected. Part of TWAIL theory is that developing states does not 
                                                 
351 Evans, David, and Shaffer, Gregory C., “Introduction” in Shaffer, Gregory C. & 
Meléndez-Ortiz, Ricardo (eds.), Dispute settlement at the WTO: the developing country 
experience, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, page 1. See also  
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always act in the best interest of their population. Thus, even if developing 
countries, as sovereign entities, achieved what they wanted in the 
negotiations, the results for the population would be the true determining 
factor as for whether or not the instruments perpetuate the subordination of 
developing countries in the eyes of TWAIL scholars. 
Moreover, the motivations behind ABS, as examined in chapter 5 of this 
thesis, highlight the issue. Only one of the motivations concern individuals or 
groups of individuals. The other motivations highlight the importance of ABS 
for the state. As a way for the state to receive fair compensation for the 
utilization of natural resources belonging to that state or as an incentive to 
conserve biodiversity. The one motivation that does concern individuals or 
groups of individuals is specifically concerned with local or indigenous 
groups, not farmers (or any other group for that matter).  
Biodiversity plays an important role in the improvement of plant varieties and 
safeguarding food security as has been identified by the ITPGRFA, the CBD 
and the Nagoya Protocol. There must therefore be strong incentives to secure 
and conserve biodiversity. However, the utilization of the genetic resources 
on improving plant varieties is what will safeguard food security, not vast, 
unused biological diversity. There must also therefore be incentives to 
develop new plant varieties and improve existing ones. 
Currently, international instruments offer clear obligations to conserve 
biodiversity, but few incentives to do so, particularly for developing 
countries. The prospects of the gene revolution are, primarily, advanced in 
the developed world. Few developing countries can afford or know how to 
cultivate plant varieties on the scale that private entities in the developed 
world can and are doing. Moreover, there are strong incentives for private 
entities to create new plant varieties due to the protection given to them 
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through patents or the sui generis system that the TRIPs Agreement mandate 
states to have in place and the growth of the trade in seeds.352 
Farmers are the ones who safeguard food security and in many places 
conserve biodiversity. However, they cannot expect to gain much from the 
international instruments. Benefit-sharing in the CBD and the Nagoya 
Protocol are incentives for states to conserve biodiversity, not for the 
inhabitants of said state. The ITPGRFA pools together benefit-sharing 
through a multilateral system into a benefit-sharing fund based on the 
commercialization of accessed genetic resources, either voluntarily or 
mandated. So far it has not received any payments and its prospects are 
looking meagre. The Governing Body for the ITPGRFA introduced a fund-
raising target to be achieved by 2014.353 The target lies at US$ 116 million 
but estimates suggest that it will take 38 years to reach that goal if the 
ITPGRFA does not gain more members.354 Even under very favourable 
conditions, the yearly fund-raising goal of US$23 million likely will not be 
reached before the year 2028.355 
Any monetary benefits that the instruments may accumulate seem unlikely to 
reach farmers directly.  Non-monetary benefits may have a higher chance of 
affecting farmers. The transfer of technology as well as the capacity-building 
envisioned in the instruments may provide indirect long-term benefits to 
farmers through increased national research in and on areas and plant varieties 
neglected by private entities. 
                                                 
352 The International Seed Federation estimates the value of global field, vegetable and 
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While ABS is an important part of the CBD it is not the most integral part 
judging from the emphasis and clarity awarded on one hand the provisions on 
conservation, and on the other hand and regarding the adoption of measures 
on benefit-sharing. Juxtaposing the promising, but vague, regulations 
regarding access and benefit-sharing that leave much discretion for states 
against the much more clear and detailed obligations regarding conservation 
of biodiversity show the true picture. ABS was a part of the grand bargain 
that is the CBD, an aspect that would increase the likelihood of adoption and 
ratifications by states.356 Similarly, the Nagoya Protocol clarifies aspects of 
benefit-sharing, but the detailed provisions regulate access to genetic 
resources, not benefit-sharing. It should come as no surprise that benefit-
sharing is unlikely to have very large, direct, effects on farmers in developing 
countries. 
The ITPGRFA on the other hand offer clear and detailed provisions on 
benefit-sharing, and the SMTA adopted by the Governing Body makes the 
process of acquiring genetic resources more transparent and predictable. The 
ITPGRFA does suffer from its own problems though. The Multilateral 
System for benefit-sharing only covers certain species and genera making it 
easier to circumvent the otherwise obligatory payments to the Benefit-sharing 
fund. 
It is thus fair to say that farmers are likely to see benefits shared, arising from 
the utilization of genetic resources. However, benefits for farmers seem to 
focus on the improved plant varieties likely to be developed from the 
preserved biodiversity and the facilitated access mandated by the instruments, 
as well as the protection a large base of genetic resources offer to prevent the 
effects of genetic erosion. In this regard it is important to note that the new 
plant varieties, likely, are able to gain protection under the international 
intellectual property regime.  
                                                 
356 For more aspects of the grand bargain see McGraw, Désirée M., “The CBD – Key 
Characteristics and Implications for Implementation” in Review Of European Community & 
International Environmental Law,  vol. 11, issue 1, 2002, pages  17-28. 
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Further benefits may be given to farmers from states accruing benefits shared 
in accordance with the CBD or the Nagoya Protocol. However, the 
instruments only govern benefit-sharing on behalf of states. Any further 
sharing of the benefits with farmers would be voluntary and entirely 
dependent on the good will of that state. 
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